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SLIDING SCALE SETTLEMENTS: THE NEED FOR A
MINIMUM CONTRIBUTION TO COMPLY WITH
THE REASONABLE RANGE TEST FOR
GOOD FAITH
I. INTRODUCTION
The California tort contribution statutes' introduced a good faith
requirement for pretrial settlements in suits involving multiple
tortfeasors. A good faith settlement releases a settling defendant not
only from liability to the plaintiff but also from claims for partial indem-
nity2 by any co-defendants. The amount of the settlement is then de-
ducted from any judgment levied against the nonsettling defendant or
defendants at a trial.3 Because of its effect on the financial liability of
nonsettling parties, the crucial issue becomes how to define a good faith
settlement.
California appellate courts have developed competing good faith
tests. One, the reasonable range test, focuses on the relationship between
the settlement amount and the settling defendant's proportionate share of
liability.4 The tortious conduct test, on the other hand, examines the
conduct of the parties in negotiating the agreement.5 Recently, in Tech-
Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,6 the California Supreme
Court decided the issue by enunciating a test for good faith which re-
quires that the agreement be within a "reasonable range" of the settling
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). The principle of con-
tribution allows a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered to recover proportional
shares of judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the injury and
who were also liable to the plaintiff. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (5th ed. 1979). See infra
notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of partial indemnity
under American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1978).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
4. See Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984);
Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975); River
Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972). See
infira text accompanying notes 41-55.
5. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disap-
proved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7,
698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985) (disapproving cases employing tor-
tious conduct test for good faith similar to test employed by Stambaugh court). See infra notes
56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stambaugh.
6. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
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defendant's fair share of potential liability.7 This standard raises signifi-
cant issues when the pretrial settlement is a sliding scale agreement8 be-
cause these agreements may enable the settling defendant to escape an
action without making any contribution to the damage award. This situ-
ation arises when the settling party guarantees the plaintiff a minimum
recovery in exchange for an agreement that he will be relieved from lia-
bility should the plaintiff recover the guarantee amount or more in a
judgment against the remaining defendant. If the minimum guarantee
amount has been satisfied, the settling defendant's financial liability is
zero.
This Comment addresses three issues with respect to sliding scale
settlements and good faith: First, does California Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877.5, which authorizes the existence of sliding scale settle-
ments, implicitly require that these agreements meet the standards of a
good faith settlement? Second, does Tech-Bilt mandate that courts em-
ploy a reasonable range test rather than a tortious conduct test when
determining the good faith of sliding scale settlements? Finally, assum-
ing a reasonable range test is required, what are its components, and how
should it be applied by the courts in cases involving sliding scale
agreements?
This Comment suggests that the reasonable range test adopted by
the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt must encompass sliding scale
settlement agreements. The rationale of Tech-Bilt is to protect nonset-
tling joint tortfeasors from an inequitable shift in liability when a co-
defendant settles prior to trial. This effect currently exists in sliding scale
cases and will continue unless the Tech-Bilt rule is extended to those
agreements.
This Comment also examines the proper application of the reason-
able range test to sliding scale settlements. It will discuss the factors
which should be considered in determining the reasonable range of a set-
tling defendant's potential liability in light of several recent California
Appellate Court decisions including Riverside Steel Construction Co. v.
William H. Simpson Construction Co.,9 Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior
Court,10 and City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court." The author will
conclude that in these decisions the courts incorrectly applied the reason-
7. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
8. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text discussing the anatomy of a sliding scale
agreement.
9. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority).
10. 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority).
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able range test articulated in Tech-Bilt, and as a result upheld sliding
scale settlements which should have been rejected. Finally, the author
will propose a workable method by which counsel can negotiate valid
and equitable sliding scale agreements which meet the requirements of a
good faith settlement.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section will review the historical development of tort contribu-
tion law in California as well as the evolution of the good faith settlement
requirement. These general concepts provide the fundamental frame-
work that gives rise to the more specific problems posed by sliding scale
settlement agreements.
A. The Development of California Tort Contribution Law
1. Common law
In California, the doctrine of joint and several liability governs the
imposition of liability among multiple tortfeasors. 12  Each defendant
found to be jointly and severally liable is individually responsible for a
plaintiff's entire injury and for 100% of any judgment resulting from that
injury. A plaintiff may choose to collect an entire judgment from any
one defendant, but is not compelled to collect from all defendants.13 Ab-
sent a mechanism by which a tortfeasor can force other tortfeasors to
contribute to the verdict, this system historically led to unfairness where
a plaintiff chose to collect the entire judgment from only one of several
joint tortfeasors. At early common law, and in the majority of American
jurisdictions, courts refused to recognize the right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors 4 The courts reasoned that "the law should deny assist-
ance to tortfeasors in adjusting losses among themselves because they are
11. 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), vacating and remanding 160 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984).
12. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 590, 578 P.2d 899, 906,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978). See also Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the Califor-
nia Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Associ-
ation v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1482-85 (1979); Comment, Joint Torts and
Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937).
13. Balding v. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 562, 54 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1966)
(holding that a plaintiff should be able to control his case by proceeding against the party or
parties he determines are most clearly liable).
14. Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1962) (reiterat-
ing common law rule that one tortfeasor could not obtain contribution from another); see
generally Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The
New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779 (1978).
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wrongdoers and the law should not aid wrongdoers."' s As a result, a
plaintiff could recover for his injury from one defendant although there
were other, equally culpable defendants. The defendant from whom the
plaintiff recovered, however, had no recourse against the nonpaying co-
tortfeasors. 16 California adopted and followed this rule until 1957.17
2. Statutory developments
In an effort to alleviate the harshness of the common law rule, the
California Legislature, in 1957, enacted a series of reforms known as the
tort contribution statutes.1" California Code of Civil Procedure section
875 established a right of contribution among two or more tortfeasors
where a money judgment had been rendered jointly against them.19 A
defendant could exercise this right only after paying the entire judgment
or more than his pro rata share2 0 He was then entitled to contribution
from his co-defendant for any payment made in excess of his pro rata
share.21
Although these statutes codified the right to contribution, they were
initially of limited value. In order for there to be a right of contribution
there had to be a joint judgment.22 By suing only one tortfeasor, or less
15. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993 n.5, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 503 n.5 (1972).
16. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712-13, 195 P. 389, 389-90 (1921) (adopting
generally accepted rule that there is no right to contribution between joint tortfeasors). A
general exception to this rule might occur as a result of contract or equitable considerations.
City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 130, 330 P.2d 802, 803-04 (1958).
17. Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 271, 363 P.2d 873, 874, 14 Cal. Rptr. 641, 642
(1961) (stating that prior to enactment of contribution statutes one tortfeasor could not obtain
contribution from another); Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712-13, 195 P. 389, 389
(1921). Dean Prosser said of this rule, "[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule
which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintention-
ally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the.., plaintiff's whim or spite,
or the plaintiff's collusion with the wrongdoer...." W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 337-38 (5th ed. 1984).
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980).
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West 1980). See E. B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court,
56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 653, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1976) (explaining rule that right to contri-
bution does not arise unless joint judgment has been entered and one defendant has discharged
judgment or paid more than his pro rata share).
20. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980). See E. B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court,
56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 653, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541, 543 (1976). A pro rata share is determined by
dividing the total judgment by the number of tortfeasors, excluding those who are insolvent or
could not be made parties to the action, and then assigning such pro rata share to each joint
tortfeasor. Wesierski, Mary Carter Agreements and Good Faith Settlements-Are They Both
Possible in California?, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 639, 647 n.26 (1981).
21. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980).
22. Id. § 875(a).
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than all the tortfeasors, a plaintiff could undermine the contribution right
because defendants could only collect contribution from other defendants
named in the suit.23 Accordingly, in certain situations, a defendant still
had no right to obtain contribution from an equally liable, but unnamed
joint tortfeasor. As will be discussed below, judicial modification and
interpretation of these statutes has dramatically improved the situation.24
The contribution statutes also introduced the concept of a good faith
settlement. Under these provisions, a settlement made prior to trial dis-
charged the settling defendant "from all liability for any contribution to
any other tortfeasors," provided that the settlement was made in good
faith.25 Further, the statute provided that any verdict rendered against
the remaining defendants would be reduced by the amount of the good
faith settlement.26 Because the statute did not define the concept specifi-
cally, the "good faith" controversy was born. 27
3. Case law
The California Supreme Court in effect modified the meaning and
scope of the contribution laws in several key decisions, including Li v.
Yellow Cab Co. 28 and American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court.29 In Li, the court imposed a system of pure comparative negli-
gence whereby damages are apportioned on the basis of percentage of
23. Thus, if A, B and C were jointly and severally liable for D's injury and D sued only B,
B could not sue A and C for contribution because a judgment had not been rendered against
them. See General Elec. Co. v. State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 925-26,
108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 547-48 (1973); Fleming, supra note 12, at 1487-88. An example of a
situation where a plaintiff might not want to name all potentially liable defendants occurred in
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1978). In that case, two of the potential defendants were the plaintiff's parents. By not
naming them in the complaint, the plaintiff attempted to shield his parents from a claim for
contribution. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
24. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), and the
concept of partial indemnity.
25. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980). Under the common law, a settlement
with one joint tortfeasor generally acted to release all other joint tortfeasors from liability for
the injury. See Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement with One Co-Obligor upon the Obliga-
tions of the Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1959).
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980).
27. See infra note 38 for a discussion of the issues involved in a good faith determination.
28. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
29. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). For a discussion of the effects
of Li and American Motorcycle on tort contribution law, see Comment, Comparative Negli-
gence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1264 (1977); Comment, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The New Doctrine of Equitable
Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779 (1978).
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fault.3° For example, if a plaintiff suffered damages of $100,000 and the
jury determined that the plaintiff and defendant were both fifty percent at
fault, the plaintiff would recover only $50,000 from that defendant.
The rule announced in Li apparently contradicted the California
contribution statutes. Because the statutes allowed a claim for contribu-
tion only among parties named in a suit, one defendant could be held
liable for the entire judgment even though there were other equally liable
parties. In such a situation, the defendant will pay more than his degree
of fault compels, in direct conflict with the policy announced in Li.3'
In addition, the California contribution statutes provided for a pro
rata allocation of damages when a contribution claim was allowed, 32 re-
quiring that damages be equally divided among the joint tortfeasors.
This aspect of the statute also contradicted the policy of apportioning
damages based on percentage of fault set forth in Li. 33 Both of these
inconsistencies were subsequently addressed and reconciled by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in American Motorcycle.34
In American Motorcycle, the court employed the concept of partial
indemnity to expand the contribution rights of joint tortfeasors. The
court defined the term partial indemnity as the right of one tortfeasor,
who had paid more than his allocable share of damages, to recover the
excess from the other joint tortfeasors.35 A partial indemnity claim
could be stated by way of a cross-complaint against a co-defendant
30. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The court stated,
"we conclude that the 'all-or-nothing' rule of contributory negligence ... is herewith super-
seded by a system of 'pure' comparative negligence, the fundamental purpose of which shall be
to assign responsibility and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negli-
gence of each of the parties." Id.
31. For a discussion of comparative negligence and its inconsistency with the California
contribution statutes, see Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.: A Survey of California Practice
Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747 (1976). This issue is discussed in Stambaugh
v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); see infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text. In Stambaugh, the nonsettling defendant asserted that when one defend-
ant is allowed to settle in good faith for an amount which is disproportionately low in respect
to his degree of fault, the other defendants are required to pay an amount which exceeds that
compelled by their degree of fault. The nonsettling defendant contended that this result vio-
lated the Li court's policy of comparative negligence in which damages are apportioned in
proportion to fault. Id. at 234-35, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46. The Stambaugh court, although
recognizing the validity of this contention, rejected the notion that Li was intended to modify
Code of Civil Procedure § 877. The court held that the policy of encouraging settlement,
which was central to that code section, would be frustrated by requiring settlements which
were proportionate to the settling party's degree of fault. Id. at 235-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980).
33. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 765.
34. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for discussion of American Motorcycle.
35. 20 Cal. 3d at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
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whether or not he had been named as a defendant in the action.36 Ameri-
can Motorcycle, therefore, modified the plaintiff's ability to control the
named defendants' right to contribution by failing to name all the possi-
ble defendants.
The contribution statutes and the judicial decisions that followed
alleviated much of the historical inequity that existed when one joint
tortfeasor was required to pay an entire judgment despite the existence of
potentially viable co-defendants. At the same time, these developments
placed new emphasis on settlements and in turn on the requirement of
good faith. Only by entering into a "good faith" settlement with the
plaintiff could a tortfeasor insulate himself from claims for partial indem-
nity. 7 Thus, the definition of good faith determines the extent to which
a defendant may use the contribution statutes to avoid the harshness of
the common law.38
36. In American Motorcycle, a young boy was injured in a cross-country motorcycle race.
The boy sued AMA (the sponsor of the race) and AMA cross-claimed against the boy's par-
ents for contribution. The trial court denied the motion because the parents were not named
defendants in the suit as required by California Code of Civil Procedure § 875. The supreme
court reversed, allowing the impleading despite the dictates of the Code. Id. at 605-07, 578
P.2d at 916-18, 146 Cal. Rptr. 199-201. The creation of the concept of partial indemnity,
which allows joint tortfeasors to apportion liability on the basis of comparative fault, super-
seded the method of sharing established by the contribution statutes. "In effect, the court read
[the contribution statutes] out of the statute book. .. ." Fleming, supra note 12, at 1487. This
is because partial indemnity did away with the statutory requirements that a joint judgment be
rendered prior to "contribution" and that one defendant had paid the entire judgment or more
than his pro rata share. Id.
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); see infra notes 25-26.
38. The above point is best illustrated by an example. If two defendants, X and Y, are
found to be jointly and severally liable, a plaintiff may collect the judgment from the defendant
of his choosing. If the plaintiff wins a judgment against both X and Y and decides to collect it
from Y, under the common law Y would be forced to pay the entire award with no recourse
against X. Under the contribution statutes, Y could sue X for contribution provided that the
plaintiff named X as a defendant and the court rendered a joint judgment. After the expansion
of the contribution rules in American Motorcycle, Y could file a cross-claim for indemnity
whether or not X was a named defendant in the original suit.
The good faith settlement rules add another element. If X and Y are each 50% liable to
the plaintiff, and X enters into a pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, this settlement insulates
X from any claims for contribution or partial indemnity by Y, provided the agreement is en-
tered into in good faith. X's settlement is then deducted from the final damage award. Y will
pay only the verdict minus X's settlement price. If, however, X paid only $10.00 for his settle-
ment and the ultimate judgment equalled $25,000, Y would have to pay the remaining $24,990
even though both were 50% at fault.
If a court approved the above settlement as made in good faith, Y would not be able to
obtain partial indemnity from X. This outcome offends the policy articulated in American
Motorcycle, which expanded a tortfeasor's ability to allocate damages based on fault. The
judicial interpretation of good faith and its scope is the primary means of preventing such a
potentially unfair result.
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B. The Evolution of Good Faith
In interpreting section 877 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, courts have developed competing definitions of good faith. The
first courts to address the issue appeared to adopt a test which required
settlements to be within a reasonable range of the settling party's fair
share of liability.3 9 Subsequently, however, courts developed the "tor-
tious conduct test," which focused on the conduct of the parties in nego-
tiating the settlement.4' The mechanics and application of these
conflicting approaches and the policy considerations behind each are dis-
cussed below.
1. The reasonable range test
The reasonable range test for good faith requires that the settlement
amount reasonably reflect the portion of damages the settling party
would have been liable for had he remained in the action. This standard
was first articulated in River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court.41 In
that case, the California court of appeal faced a challenge to the good
faith of a pretrial settlement between the plaintiffs and all but one of
several joint tortfeasors. The plaintiffs were two minor children seriously
injured in a fire which also killed their parents. The children settled their
own personal injury claims as well as their claims for the wrongful death
of their parents.42 The settlement agreement allocated most of the pro-
ceeds to the wrongful death claims. The nonsettling defendant contested
this allocation, arguing that since the personal injury claims were likely
to draw significantly larger verdicts at trial, the bulk of the settlement
funds should be allocated to those claims.43 The allocation was impor-
tant because the amount allocated to each claim would be deducted from
39. See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases establishing
the "reasonable range test." This standard protects the nonsettling party from paying a dis-
proportionate share of the award. Since the good faith settlement amount is deducted from the
ultimate judgment, if that settlement reasonably reflects the settling party's liability, the non-
settlor is not unduly prejudiced by losing his right to partial indemnity. See Roberts, The
"Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 841,
930-31 (1984).
40. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases establishing the
tortious conduct test.
41. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
42. Id. at 991, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02. The childrens' personal injury claims were very
valuable because they suffered serious bodily injury including permanent physical handicaps.
The claims for wrongful death were less valuable because there was a question of contributory
negligence on the part of the parents. Id. at 991, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
43. Id. at 991, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The nonsettling defendant contended that the alloca-
tion of the disproportionately large share of the settlement funds to the less valuable wrongful
death claims isolated it as the sole target for a potentially large personal injury judgment which
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the judgment awarded by the jury with respect to that claim. Therefore,
the nonsettling defendant would benefit if most of the settlement pro-
ceeds were credited toward the claim likely to draw the larger award.
Although the court did not specifically decide the issue of good
faith,' its analysis of the good faith requirement became the basis for
future decisions. The court reasoned that, "[a]lthough many kinds of
collusive injury are possible, the most obvious and frequent is that cre-
ated by an unreasonably cheap settlement."4 Furthermore, the court
stated that "[t]he price of a settlement is the prime badge of its good or
bad faith."46 Interpreting the policy goals behind the 1957 tort contribu-
tion legislation, the River Garden Farms court suggested that a good faith
settlement must bear some relation to the settling defendant's fair share
of potential liability. According to the court, the two main policies be-
hind the statutes were "first, equitable sharing of costs among the parties
at fault, and second, encouragement of settlements."'47 The policy of eq-
uitable sharing of costs was satisfied only by a good faith analysis which
considered the price of the settlement.
In a subsequent case approving the River Garden Farms reasonable
range language, the court considered similar issues concerning the alloca-
tion of settlement funds between a plaintiff's personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims.48 Although the trial court in Lareau v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co.4 9 estimated the plaintiff's wrongful death claim to be
it would pay without any right to contribution and with credit for only the small amount of the
settlement funds allocated to those claims. Id. at 992, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
44. The court decided this issue should be litigated within the framework of the claimants'
tort suit. Id. at 1002, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
45. Id. at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 993 & n.5, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503 & n.5.
48. Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 792-99, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837,
842-47 (1975).
49. 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975). For other California cases adopting a
reasonable range analysis for the good faith of a settlement, see Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985); Torres v. Union
Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1984) (discussing good faith of sliding
scale settlement). For a Ninth Circuit opinion appearing to favor a reasonable range analysis
rather than a tortious conduct test, see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640
F.2d 210 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). In Commercial Union, the plaintiffs
sued Ford Motor Company and a Ford dealership for personal injuries. The plaintiff dis-
missed Ford Motor Company because he felt he had a better chance at trial if Ford were not a
defendant. The plaintiff reasoned that Ford would retain sophisticated counsel and expert
witnesses. Id. at 211. A verdict was entered against the dealership. Its insurance company,
Commercial Union, sued Ford Motor Company for partial indemnity. Id. at 212. Ford
claimed that the dismissal was in good faith and thus insulated it from claims for partial in-
demnity. Id.
The Ninth Circuit held that the dismissal was not in good faith. Id. at 214. It is not quite
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worth no more than $50,000, $94,000 of the settlement was apportioned
to that claim.5 0 The court of appeal, although remanding the good faith
issue to the trial court, embraced the reasonable range directive of River
Garden Farms, concluding that a definition of good faith must address
the goal of equitable apportionment of costs as well as that of encourag-
ing settlements.51
It was not until Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,52 more than
nine years after Lareau, that a California appellate court again employed
the reasonable range analysis as the test for good faith. In Torres, the
plaintiff was injured on his employer's premises while using his em-
ployer's jack to change a tire on his own car. The plaintiff sued both his
employer and the manufacturer/distributor of the jack. Prior to trial,
the plaintiff and his employer entered into a sliding scale settlement
whereby the settling defendant advanced Torres $200,000. Under the
agreement, the plaintiff was to repay the settling defendant up to
$150,000 depending on his recovery from the manufacturer/distributor.
The key element in the agreement was that the settling defendant con-
tributed $50,000 to the plaintiff's recovery regardless of the outcome of
the litigation against the remaining defendant.53
The Torres court approved the sliding scale agreement as a settle-
ment in good faith using a test similar to the one employed in River Gar-
den Farms. In rejecting the tortious conduct test, the Torres court stated
that "[h]ad the Legislature desired to approve all nontortious settle-
ments, it would merely have required that the settlements be 'lawful';
instead, it required that they be in 'good faith.' Some intent must be
accorded to the Legislature's choice of this more rigorous term." 4 To be
in good faith, the court held, a defendant's settlement figure "must not be
grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the
clear if the court based its decision on the fact that Ford had not contributed anything to
obtain the dismissal or if it focused on and rejected the tactical maneuver involved. The court
hinted that proportionality was a factor in its decision by stating that it was bound by the dual
goals of equity and settlement, neither of which should be applied to defeat the other. Id. at
213-14.
50. Lareau, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
51. Id. at 794-97, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 844-46.
52. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
53. Id. at 502-03, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28. This $50,000 figure is important because under
the California statutes if the settlement is determined to be in good faith, it will be deducted
from the ultimate judgment rendered against the nonsettling defendant. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 877 (West 1980). The fact that the $50,000 will be deducted from the ultimate award
helps to justify the other effect of the settlement--cutting off the nonsettling party's right to
partial indemnity against the settling defendant. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text
for a discussion of partial indemnity.
54. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be."25 5
2. The tortious conduct test
Prior to Torres, California courts routinely rejected the principles
articulated in River Garden Farms and developed a new test for the good
faith of pretrial settlements. The appellate decision establishing this al-
ternative test, Stambaugh v. Superior Court,5" involved an action for
wrongful death resulting from an automobile accident.5 7 In Stambaugh,
the plaintiffs settled with one of several joint tortfeasors for $25,000, the
amount of the settling defendant's (Stambaugh's) liability insurance. 8
Another defendant challenged the good faith of this settlement, question-
ing whether a $25,000 contribution by Stambaugh was sufficient to re-
lease him from liability under the comparative negligence rule
announced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.59 In approving the settlement, the
Stambaugh court declared: "Except in rare cases of collusion or bad
faith.., a joint tortfeasor should be permitted to negotiate settlement of
an adverse claim according to his own best interests .... His good faith
will not be determined by the proportion his settlement bears to the dam-
ages of the claimant."6 Thus, Stambaugh and its progeny"1 determined
55. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
56. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
57. Id. at 234, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
58. Id.
59. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See supra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Li and the doctrine of comparative negligence.
60. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (emphasis added). It is difficult to tell
exactly what type of collusive behavior constitutes bad faith. However, one court stated that
an agreement between the settling party and plaintiffs, whereby the settling party agrees to aid
plaintiff's case by committing perjury, would be such a collusive agreement. Dompeling v.
Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 810 n.7, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 45 n.7 (1981), disapproved,
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7,
213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
61. The following cases, which adopted a tortious conduct test similar to the one outlined
in Stambaugh, were expressly disapproved in Tech-bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38
Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985): Burlington N.
R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982); Cardio Sys., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981); Dompeling v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). The Tech-Bilt court, in disapproving
Dompeling and its "progeny," impliedly disapproved the following cases which also employed
a tortious conduct standard: Anderson v. International Harvester Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 100,
211 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985) (opinion withdrawn by order of the court); Imperial Spa, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1984) (ordered depublished); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz,
147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d
323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App.
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the good faith of a settlement by evaluating the motivations behind the
negotiations, without regard to the settlement price.62  Most courts
adopted the tortious conduct test and did so not for its fairness,63 but
because of their belief that the primary policy underlying the good faith
statutes was to encourage settlement of litigation.
3. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates
Recently, the California Supreme Court rendered its first decision
defining good faith and resolving the conflict discussed above. In Tech-
Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates," the court rejected the tor-
tious conduct test enunciated in Stambaugh in favor of a good faith anal-
ysis similar to the one employed in River Garden Farms. 65 The Tech-Bilt
court stated that "a more appropriate definition of 'good faith'.., would
enable the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount
of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's
proportionate share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries."
66
In Tech-Bilt, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims against one
defendant in return for the latter's agreement to waive any claims against
the plaintiffs for costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. 67 The lower
court, using the tortious conduct approach, approved the settlement after
a good faith hearing. 6" The supreme court reversed, reasoning that the
California Legislature could not have intended a tortious conduct test as
the standard for good, faith.69 The court explained that with the enact-
3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983); Young v. Lane Realty, 158 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1979) (ordered
depublished).
62. The Stambaugh court defined good faith in a manner which conformed with the strong
policy in California to encourage settlement of litigation. Id. at 235-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
63. See infra notes 106 & 227.
64. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
65. Id. at 496, 698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
66. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 492, 698 P.2d at 161, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258. Plaintiffs sued Tech-Bilt (the devel-
oper) and Woodward-Clyde (the soil engineers) for structural defects in their premises. Wood-
ward-Clyde informed the plaintiffs that it had completed its services more than 10 years
previously, thus the statute of limitations barred their claim. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss
Woodward-Clyde in exchange for Woodward-Clyde's agreement to waive its claim for costs in
defending the lawsuit. The court noted that although the statute may have run against Wood-
ward-Clyde on the plaintiffs' claim, this would not necessarily have barred Tech-Bilt from
asserting a claim against Woodward-Clyde for partial indemnity. Id. at 491-92, 698 P.2d at
161-62, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59. Hence, the lower court's determination that the settlement
between Woodward-Clyde and the plaintiffs was made in good faith adversely affected Tech-
Bilt by insulating Woodward-Clyde from a cross-claim for partial indemnity.
68. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1983), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
69. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 496, 698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
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ment of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6,70 the legislature had in-
corporated the goals of equitable allocation of costs and encouragement
of settlement into the good faith standard.7' A tortious conduct ap-
proach, the court reasoned, emphasized the goal of encouraging settle-
ment to the virtual exclusion of the equitable allocation goal. In
adopting a reasonable range analysis, the court determined that requiring
the settlement to be reasonably related to the settling party's liability
would prevent an unfair shift of liability to the nonsettling party. More-
over, the court determined that this approach is not detrimental to the
settlement process "[s]ince the 'reasonable range' test... leaves substan-
tial latitude to the parties and to the discretion of the trial court .... ,72
Two questions, however, were left unresolved by the Tech-Bilt deci-
sion: (1) whether the good faith reasonable range standard applies to
sliding scale settlements; and (2) if so, the manner in which this standard
is to be applied.
70. In 1980, the California legislature enacted California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6
which governs the mechanics of a good faith hearing. The statute also provides that a good
faith settlement insulates the settling party from any claims for equitable comparative contri-
bution or partial or comparative indemnity. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp.
1986). The Tech-Bilt court reasoned that this statute represented a codification of American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978),
and incorporated the equitable policies expressed in that decision. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 496,
698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a
discussion of American Motorcycle. Section 877.6 reads in part:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged
tortfeasors, upon giving notice thereof in the manner provided in Sections 1010 and
1011 at least 20 days before the hearing.... Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may shorten the time for giving the required notice to permit the determination
of the issue to be made before the commencement of the trial of the action, or before
the verdict or judgment if settlement is made after the trial has commenced.
(b) The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court
on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counterafidavits
filed with response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence
at the hearing.
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar, any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indem-
nity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on
that issue.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
71. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
72. Id. at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. 264 (citing Roberts, supra note 39, at 928-
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III. SLIDING SCALE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. The Anatomy of a Sliding Scale Settlement Agreement
Sliding scale settlements typically arise when there are multiple de-
fendants who are each jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's entire
injury. The plaintiff will settle with one or more of the defendants but
never with all of them. The most important aspect of a sliding scale
agreement is the guarantee clause. In this clause, the settling defendants
guarantee the plaintiff a certain minimum recovery regardless of how the
action against the remaining defendant is ultimately decided. If a judg-
ment is returned against the nonsettling defendant for an amount equal
to or in excess of the guarantee amount, the settling defendants pay noth-
ing. If a judgment is returned for less than the guarantee amount, the
settling defendants pay the difference between the judgment and the
guarantee. Finally, if the nonsettling party prevails at trial and is re-
lieved from all liability, the settling defendants must pay the plaintiff the
entire guarantee amount.73 In exchange, the plaintiff agrees to drop all
claims against the settling parties. If the court approves the agreement as
executed in good faith, the settling parties are protected from cross-
claims for partial indemnity from their co-defendants.74
In addition, the settling defendants generally agree to remain parties
to the action,7" which the plaintiff will usually be required to maintain
against the remaining defendant. Commonly, the settlement prohibits
the plaintiff from reaching an agreement with any remaining defendants
for an amount less than the guarantee amount, unless approval is first
obtained from the settling parties. 6 Finally, a common feature of many
early sliding scale agreements was secrecy; the existence of an agreement
was usually not revealed to the nonsettling defendant. Today, however,
many jurisdictions require disclosure of such agreements, at least to the
court.7
7
73. Freedman, The Expected Demise of "Mary Carter" She Never Was Well!, 633 INS.
L.J. 603, 609-10 (1975); Comment, The Mary Carter Agreement--Solving the Problems of Col-
lusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1396-97 (1974).
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
75. Comment, supra note 73, at 1396.
76. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 944, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 377 (1982), disapproved on other grounds, Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs.,
38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985). A good
example of a typical sliding scale agreement can be found in Burlington. There the settling
defendant guaranteed plaintiff a $2,000,000 recovery. In return, plaintiff agreed to press his
action against the remaining defendant and not to accept a settlement from him of less than
$2,000,000 without Burlington's approval. Id. at 944, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
77. See infra note 86 and accompanying text for a list of such jurisdictions.
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B. Judicial Reaction to Sliding Scale Settlements
Courts throughout the country have expressed reservations regard-
ing sliding scale settlements-also known as "Mary Carter" agree-
ments-and their effects on nonsettling defendants. Concerns about
sliding scale agreements first gained prominence in the 1967 Florida case
of Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co.7T In that case, the plaintiff charged
three defendants with negligent operation of their automobiles, resulting
in the death of his wife.7 9 Prior to trial, the plaintiff and one defendant
negotiated a "Mary Carter" agreement which guaranteed the plaintiff a
$12,500 recovery and limited the settling defendant's potential maximum
contribution to that amount.80 The settlement was structured so that the
settling defendant's liability was reduced as the recovery against the re-
maining defendant reached higher levels. The Booth court upheld this
agreement as valid," and the generic name for sliding scale settlements
was born.
82
Subsequently, Booth was partially rejected in Ward v. Ochoa. 3 In
that case, the Florida Supreme Court, without rejecting "Mary Carter"
agreements per se,84 required that they be admitted into evidence at the
request of the nonsettling party.8 Many jurisdictions around the coun-
try have adopted a similar approach when addressing sliding scale
settlements.
86
78. 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 11.
82. California courts uniformly refer to such agreements as sliding scale settlements.
83. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
84. In one case, a Florida court was asked to invalidate "Mary Carter" agreements as
violative of public policy. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972). The Maule court refused, stating "we can neither condone nor condemn such agree-
ments generically." Id. at 447.
85. Ward, 284 So. 2d at 387. The court held: "If the agreement shows that the signing
defendant will have his maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more
co-defendants, such agreement should be admitted ... upon the request of any other defendant
who may stand to lose as a result of such agreement." Id.
86. See Anderson v. Kemp, 279 Ala. 321, 184 So. 2d 832 (1966) (nonsettling defendant
may enter sliding scale settlement into evidence to show partial compensation to plaintiff for
his injury); Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Const. Co., 117 Ariz. 11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (sliding scale agreements may be admitted into evidence at discretion of trial judge);
Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Gaither, 272 Ind. 251, 397 N.E.2d 589 (1979) (agreements must be
disclosed when necessary to ensure nonsettling defendant a fair trial); General Motors Corp. v.
Lahoki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980) (jury should be informed as to agreement
between parties); Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972) (disclosure of agree-
ment's existence but not of amount is at discretion of trial judge); General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (sliding scale agreements must be admitted into evidence
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An example of the inequity which can result when a sliding scale
agreement is kept secret occurred in Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v.
Emrich." In Ponderosa Timber, the plaintiffs and the insurance carrier
for two co-defendants entered into a secret sliding scale settlement. The
settlor guaranteed the plaintiffs a recovery of $20,000 in return for the
plaintiffs' agreement to press their action against the remaining defend-
ants. If the plaintiffs won a verdict in excess of $20,000 at trial the insur-
ance carrier would pay nothing."8 At the trial, the attorney for the
insurance carrier stated to the jury that, in the interest of justice, he must
inform them that there was no merit to any of the defenses which had
been asserted at the trial.8 9 Since the jury was unaware of the defend-
ants' interest in a large verdict for the plaintiff, the attorney's statement
was obviously quite damaging to the nonsettling defendants. 90
At least one jurisdiction completely piohibited sliding scale agree-
ments as contrary to public policy. In Lum v. Stinnett,91 the Nevada
Supreme Court ruled that "Mary Carter" agreements contravened public
policy as well as the goals underlying the Canons of Professional Con-
duct.92 The court reasoned that it was improper to allow a situation
where defense counsel continued to participate in the litigation while his
interest was actually in furthering the plaintiff's cause.9a
C. California Statutory Enactment--Section 87Z5
It was in this environment that the California Legislature enacted
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5.91 Section 877.5 compels the dis-
under certain circumstances). California codified the disclosure requirement under certain cir-
cumstances. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980). See infra notes 94-98. For a dis-
cussion of the differing approaches to the secrecy issue, see Comment, Mary Carter
Agreements: A Viable Means of Settlement?, 14 TULSA L.J. 744, 752-61 (1979).
87. 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970).
88. Id. at 627, 478 P.2d at 359.
89. Id. at 628, 478 P.2d at 360.
90. The jury returned a verdict against all the defendants for $35,000. Id. at 626, 472 P.2d
at 359.
91. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
92. The court refers to a statement issued by the Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. at 409-11, 488 P.2d at 351-52.
93. Id. at 409-11, 488 P.2d at 351-52. Since then, but after California enacted § 877.5, the
Oklahoma courts articulated the following rule: If the sliding scale agreement hinges on the
amount of the ultimate verdict, the trial court should review the agreement and either hold
that the portion granting the settling defendant an interest in a larger defense verdict invalid as
against public policy, or dismiss the settling defendant from the suit. Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 594 P.2d 354, 359 (Okla. 1978).
94. Cal. A.B. 1275, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5
(West 1980)). The statute reads as follows:
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closure of existing sliding scale settlements to the court.9 The statute
further provides that when a party defendant to the agreement testifies,
the jury shall be informed of the agreement upon motion of a party to the
action.96 Disclosure to the jury is not compelled if such disclosure will
create "substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.
9 7
The text of the statutes speaks only to the issue of secrecy. How-
ever, the courts have interpreted this statute, in conjunction with Code of
Civil Procedure section 877,98 to require that sliding scale agreements
meet good faith standards.
D. Judicial Decisions After the Enactment of Section 87Z5
An early appellate decision discussing sliding scale settlements and
good faith was Dompeling v. Superior Court.99 In that case Dompeling,
the driver of a large truck, swerved to avoid a school bus stopped along-
side the road. The truck collided with an oncoming car, severely injuring
(a) Where an agreement or covenant is made which provides for a sliding scale
recovery agreement between one or more, but not all, alleged defendant tortfeasors
and the plaintiff or plaintiffs:
(1) The parties entering into any such agreement or covenant shall promptly
inform the court in which the action is pending of the existence of the agreement or
covenant and its terms and provisions; and
(2) If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agreement
is a witness, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to the jury the existence
and content of the agreement or covenant, unless the court finds that such disclosure
will create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of mis-
leading the jury.
The jury disclosure herein required shall be no more than necessary to be sure
that the jury understands (1) the essential nature of the agreement, but not including
the amount paid, or any contingency, and (2) the possibility that the agreement may
bias the testimony of the alleged tortfeasor or tortfeasors who entered into the agree-
ment.
(b) As used in this section a "sliding scale agreement" means an agreement or
covenant between a plaintiff or plaintiffs and one or more, but not all, alleged
tortfeasor defendants, where the agreement limits the liability of the agreeing
tortfeasor defendants to an amount which is dependent upon the amount of recovery
which the plaintiff is able to recover from the nonagreeing defendant or defendants.
This includes, but is not limited to, agreements within the scope of Section 877, and
agreements in the form of a loan from the agreeing tortfeasor defendant to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs which is repayable in whole or in part from the recovery against the
nonagreeing tortfeasor defendant.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980).
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(1) (West 1980).
96. Id. § 877.5(a)(2).
97. Id.
98. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
99. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved on other grounds, Tech-
Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
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its driver. The plaintiff sued both Dompeling and the school district re-
sponsible for operating the bus. Prior to trial, the plaintiff and Dompel-
ing negotiated a sliding scale settlement."°° In upholding the agreement,
the Dompeling court applied the good faith requirement of California
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.101 It concluded that, like any other
settlement releasing a joint tortfeasor from liability, a sliding scale agree-
ment must meet the test of good faith. However, it employed a tortious
conduct test, stating that " 'a joint tortfeasor should be permitted to nego-
tiate settlement of an adverse claim to his own best interests .... His good
faith will not be determined by the proportion his settlement bears to the
damages of the claimant.' "102
The court faced a similar challenge to the good faith of a sliding
scale agreement in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Superior
Court.10 3 The injury in that case occurred when the door of a refrigera-
tor car owned by Burlington Northern and manufactured by Paccar fell
on the plaintiff causing serious injury. The plaintiff and Burlington
Northern agreed to a sliding scale settlement which guaranteed the plain-
tiff a $2,000,000 recovery. Paccar challenged the good faith of the agree-
ment. 104 Just as in Dompeling, the Burlington Northern court analyzed
the good faith of the agreement under section 877.105 In approving the
settlement, the court employed a tortious conduct test requiring only
that, in negotiating the agreement, the settling parties refrain from tor-
tious or other wrongful conduct aimed at the nonsettling parties.
10 6
100. The agreement guaranteed the plaintiff a recovery of $100,000. This represented the
limits of Dompeling's liability insurance. Under the agreement, Dompeling might also have
been required to contribute an additional $10,000 depending on the plaintiff's recovery from
the remaining defendant. Id. at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
101. Id. at 805 n.5, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42 n.5. In its analysis of good faith the court relied on
cases employing Code of Civil Procedure § 877. Id. at 805-09, 173 Cal. Rptr. 41-44 (citing
Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by
inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d
159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985) (disapproving cases employing tortious con-
duct test for good faith similar to test employed by the Stambaugh court); River Garden
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972)).
102. Id. at 806, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43 (quoting Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.
App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (1976) (emphasis in original)).
103. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disapproved on other grounds, Tech-
Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
104. Id. at 944, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The trial court agreed that the settlement was not
consumated in good faith because it ignored equitable apportionment and failed to promote
settlement of litigation. Id.
105. Id. at 944-47, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377-79. The court discussed § 877 and then proceeded
to define good faith using cases which interpreted that statute. Id.
106. Id. at 945-47, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79. The court questioned the fairness of the agree-
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Without exception, courts have reaffirmed the principle that sliding
scale agreements must meet the good faith standards established for
other pretrial settlements involving multiple tortfeasors. 10 7 Moreover, in
Tech-Bilt the supreme court settled the dispute as to which good faith
standard was correct by adopting a reasonable range analysis.
IV. GOOD FAITH AND SLIDING SCALE SETTLEMENTS
AFTER TECH-BILT
In recent months three cases concerning the good faith of sliding
scale settlements have been decided. These cases illustrate many of the
motivations for entering into such agreements. Initially, this section will
discuss the facts of each case as well as the reasoning for each court's
decision. Subsequently, the decisions will be examined in light of the
general principles of the contribution statutes and the good faith princi-
ples articulated by the supreme court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Associates. 05 Finally, this section will recommend modifica-
tions to the rules announced in the appellate court opinions to conform
these rules to the California Supreme Court's determinations in the Tech-
Bilt opinion.
A. Examination of the Cases
1. Riverside Steel Construction Co. v. William H. Simpson
Construction Co.
The first case decided after the Tech-Bilt decision that analyzed a
sliding scale settlement was Riverside Steel Construction Co. v. William
H. Simpson Construction Co. 'o9 In that case, the plaintiff suffered injuries
when he fell from a building during its construction. The plaintiff sued
both the general contractor (Simpson) and the subcontractor (Riverside)
for negligent maintenance of the work site.' 10 The plaintiff and Simpson
ment but stated that such policy considerations were matters for the legislature. Id. at 946,
187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
107. A recent case reiterating that the good faith rules apply to sliding scale settlements is
Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co., 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 795, 217
Cal. Rptr. 569, 577, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985). For a discussion
of Riverside Steel, see infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text. The Riverside Steel court
stated that, although few California appellate decisions discussing sliding scale settlements had
been decided after the enactment of § 877.5, those which had required the agreements to meet
the standards of good faith. The Riverside Steel court reaffirmed that premise. Id.
108. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985); see supra notes 64-72, infra
notes 197-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tech-Bilt.
109. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985).
110. Id. at 785-86, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
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negotiated a sliding scale settlement which guaranteed the plaintiff a
$350,000 recovery. The agreement also provided that if a judgment was
returned against Riverside for $350,000 or more Simpson would not be
required to pay anything. The trial court's determination that the settle-
ment was made in good faith was challenged by Riverside."'
The appellate court affirmed the good faith finding. In doing so, it
addressed several issues generated by the supreme court's decision in
Tech-Bilt. 2 The court focused its analysis on Riverside's claim that, by
disapproving Dompeling v. Superior Court 1 13 and Burlington Northern
Railroad Co. v. Superior Court,"1 4 the Tech-Bilt majority meant to reject
all sliding scale settlements that did not include a minimum uncondi-
tional contribution from the settling defendant."' Riverside asserted
that the proper determinant of whether a settlement price was within the
reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of potential liability is
the settling party's minimum unconditional contribution, not the maxi-
mum amount guaranteed by the settlement.1
6
The Riverside Steel court concluded that this interpretation of Tech-
Bilt was both textually and analytically unsound. From a textual view-
point, nowhere in the Tech-Bilt opinion did the court mention or even
discuss a minimum contribution requirement." 7 Moreover, the Tech-
Bilt court chose to overrule Dompeling and Burlington Northern only in a
footnote with little elaboration."' From this the Riverside Steel court
concluded "we do not believe that the Tech-Bilt majority intended to
cavalierly overturn a legislative enactment in a footnote without discuss-
ing that subject.""' 9 Rather, the Riverside Steel court found that Tech-
Bilt merely disapproved of the language in those cases asserting that
good faith meant only the absence of tortious or collusive conduct.' 20
Analytically speaking, the court reasoned that, if adopted, River-
111. Id. at 789, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
112. Id. at 792-97, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 576-79. The Riverside Steel court began by determin-
ing that the Tech-Bilt decision applied to sliding scale settlements. Riverside Steel, 171 Cal.
App. 3d at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
113. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr.
256, 264 n.7 (1985).
114. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 186 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1982), disapproved, Tech-Alt, 38 Cal. 3d at
500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
115. Riverside Steel, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 793-94, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
116. Id. at 794, 217 Cap. Rptr. at 577.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264
n.7).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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side's framework would render sliding scale settlements valueless. 2 '
This premise was based on the structure of such settlements. Under Riv-
erside's approach, the settling defendant must agree to contribute a mini-
mum amount which is within the reasonable range of its own potential
liability. If that were the case it seems highly unlikely that in addition to
agreeing to pay its fair share of liability, a settling defendant would also
agree to guarantee the plaintiff a recovery greatly in excess of that
amount.122 The settling defendant would be better off with a straight
settlement for an amount reasonably reflecting his liability which does
not expose him to the further risk of paying the guarantee amount.
Moreover, the court reasoned, a minimum contribution requirement
would discourage settlements. 123 This is true because, knowing that the
settlement amount would be deducted from any judgment against them,
nonsettling defendants would be risking little by continuing to trial.
Should they lose, all they would be required to pay is their proportionate
share of fault. If they prevail they would pay nothing. Finally, the court
agreed with Simpson's assertion that Tech-Bilt merely focused on pro-
portionality as one factor in a host of considerations which should be
examined in a good faith analysis.' 24 Therefore, it was unnecessary to
hold an agreement which did not call for an unconditional minimum
requirement as per se in bad faith.
2 5
After concluding that the settlement was not invalid as a matter of
law the court sidestepped the good faith determination. Since Riverside
had not raised the issue in the trial court, the appellate court concluded
that it could not address whether Simpson's settlement was within the
reasonable range of its potential liability.
2 6
121. Id. at 796, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
122. Id. Discussed infra at note 242 and accompanying text.
123. Id. Although the Riverside Steel court does not discuss it, Tech-Bilt recognized en-
couraging settlements as a goal of the tort contribution statutes. See Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at
494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
124. Riverside Steel, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
125. Id. Without developing the point, the Riverside Steel court observed that even though
no unconditional minimum contribution requirement was called for, the settlement guarantee
had a certain value analogous to an insurance policy protecting the plaintiff from a defense
verdict. This value, the court reasoned, should be considered in determining whether the set-
tlement price met reasonable range requirements. Id.
126. Id. at 797-78, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The court mentioned two additional factors it
would have considered in a good faith determination had it considered the issue. First, the
court suggested that the amount of money the party challenging good faith set as the total
value of the plaintiff's claim and the amount that party stands ready to contribute to a settle-
ment should be considered. More importantly, the court instructed that any provisions in a
settlement designed to discourage settlement with defendants who are not parties to the agree-
ment are void as violative of public policy. Id. at 798, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
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2. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court
In Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court,127 a woman was seriously
injured when a tire jarred loose from an oncoming van and smashed
through her windshield. The woman sued several defendants for per-
sonal injuries including her loss of vision. Her husband sued for loss of
consortium. In settlement negotiations, defendant Abbott offered to
cover seventy percent of plaintiffs' estimated recovery if all parties would
agree to settle. The other defendants refused the offer. The plaintiffs and
Abbott then reached a sliding scale agreement whereby Abbott guaran-
teed a $3,000,000 recovery for all the claims. The agreement prohibited
the plaintiffs from settling with the remaining defendants for under
$3,000,000 without Abbott's consent and also provided that if the final
award equaled or exceeded $3,000,000, Abbott would not have to con-
tribute to the recovery at all.
1 28
The trial court refused to approve the agreement as a good faith
settlement. Its rejection of the agreement was based "'on the fact that
Abbott Ford had not paid any amount in settlement and that the guaran-
tee agreement does not constitute [a] settlement, but rather constitutes a
gambling transaction.' ,129 The appellate court disagreed, although it
acknowledged that the principles outlined in Tech-Bilt were applicable to
sliding scale settlements.
1 30
Initially, in determining whether the sliding scale settlement before
it conformed with the good faith standards set forth in Tech-Bilt, the
Abbott court engaged in a public policy discussion. The court endeav-
ored to elucidate the interests served by this particular settlement.
Among the benefits the court attributed to the agreement were the imme-
diate cash payments the plaintiffs would receive. This money would not
only help support the plaintiffs until the final resolution of the action, but
it would ensure the plaintiffs' financial ability to pursue a recovery. The
court also found compelling the fact that the agreement provided a will-
ing defendant the opportunity to settle despite the "recalcitrance" of its
co-defendants.
1 31
The Abbott court only briefly discussed the settlement in terms of
the reasonable range analysis adopted by the supreme court in Tech-Bilt.
Relying on Tech-Bilt and Riverside Steel, the Abbott court reasoned that
127. 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985).
128. Id. at 678-80, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
129. Id. at 681, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (citing a minute order filed by the trial court).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 684-85, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
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"ultimate disproportionate allocation in and of itself was not necessarily
a mark of bad faith." '132 It then relied on Riverside Steel to conclude that
an agreement, though potentially allowing one culpable tortfeasor to es-
cape the action while paying nothing, did not necessarily fail the reason-
able range test for good faith.133 The court rested its conclusion on two
critical factors: First, the strong public policies served by the settle-
ment 34 and second, the fact that Tech-Bilt listed a host of factors to
consider in a good faith determination, only one of which was apportion-
ment of damages.13
5
The Abbott court justified the settlement as a carefully considered
and appropriate response to the practical position of the settling party at
the time it was executed, and found "noteworthy" the extent to which
the agreement served the interests of the plaintiff.' 36 The court con-
cluded that, considering the circumstances under which the settlement
was negotiated, no violation of the Tech-Bilt principles had occurred.
3. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,'37 the plaintiff was involved
in a car accident in which his automobile overturned. He was taken to
the emergency room at a local hospital where he was examined by a
physician. Because of his blood alcohol level, the hospital released the
plaintiff to the police, who arrested him and took him to the City jail.
The plaintiff's mother picked him up there and brought him home. Since
he was unable to move his lower extremities, the plaintiff's mother had
an ambulance return him to the hospital. He became a parapalegic who
also lost some use of his arms.
1 3 8
The plaintiff sued the hospital, the ambulance service and the exam-
ining physician for medical negligence. He sued the City for its negli-
gence in handling, transporting, booking and confining him. He also
alleged a battery for his detention, arrest and handling by the City.'
39
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 682, 684, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11. Among the factors the Abbott court lists
were: "'a rough approximation of the plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate
liability, the amount paid in settlement .... and a recognition that settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.'" Id. at 682, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
610 (citing Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263).
136. Id. at 685, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
137. 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), vacating and remanding 160 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984).
138. Id. at 860-61, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
139. Id. at 861, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
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Prior to trial, the plaintiff and all defendants except the City entered
into a sliding scale settlement."4  The terms of the agreement 141 were as
follows:
1) The settling defendants would loan the plaintiff the price of
an annuity contract. This annuity would provide the plaintiff
with $5000 monthly payments for life and certain deferred
lump sum payments.'
42
2) If the City of Los Angeles obtained a defense verdict at the
conclusion of the litigation, 143 the settling defendants would
pay the plaintiff $750,000 and absolve him from responsibility
to repay the loan used to purchase the annuity. 144
3) If the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the City equal
to or exceeding the guarantee amount, 45 the settling defend-
ants would be released from further liability and the plaintiff
would repay to the settling defendants the loan used to
purchase the annuity.
146
4) If the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the City for less
than the guarantee amount, the settling defendants would pay
the plaintiff the difference between the amount of the judgment
and the guarantee amount. 147
5) Plaintiff was further required to prosecute this action
against the City of Los Angeles in the same way he would have
proceeded in the absence of this agreement.148
Upon motion by the settling defendants, the trial court determined
140. Id. at 861-62, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565. The City, it appears, did not seriously attempt to
negotiate a pretrial settlement with the plaintiff. Although the final settlement agreed upon
with the other defendants was for $1,900,000, the City never mentioned a contribution of more
than $50,000 during the settlement negotiations. Id. at 862, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
141. Agreement between Paul Hutcherson and Daniel Freeman Memorial Hospital, its
agents, Jerome Robinson, M.D., and Goodhew Ambulance Service, Release and Sliding Scale
Recovery Agreements (copy on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Agreement].
142. Id.
143. Id. at 3. By terms of the Agreement, "conclusion of the litigation" was defined as:
[A] final judgment after trial, appeal, and retrial of this litigation, if any, together
with the trial, appeal, and retrial of any and all actions necessary to resolve any
questions of any tortfeasor's insurance coverage, as well as any and all questions with
respect to interpretation and enforceability of any portion of this Agreement ....
Agreement, supra note 141, at 3.
144. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
145. The guarantee amount equalled the purchase price of the annuity plus the $750,000
guarantee. The present value of this amount was estimated at $1.9 million dollars. Id.
146. Id. at 861-62, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
147. Id. at 861, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
148. Agreement, supra note 141, at 8.
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that the agreement met good faith requirements. The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's findings. Although the California Supreme
Court granted a hearing to review the case, it was returned to the appel-
late court for reconsideration in light of the principles enunciated in
Tech-Bilt.149 Following remand from the supreme court, the court of
appeals discussed the good faith requirements for sliding scale settle-
ments and remanded the case to the trial court for further factual
findings.
The appellate court considered the primary issue to be whether the
Agreement, which potentially placed the entire burden of loss on the
City, wasper se not in good faith.15 0 The court stated that any good faith
determination must take into account the numerous factors set forth in
Tech-Bilt.'5 ' Any settlement so far "out of the ballpark" in relation to
those factors as to defeat the equitable objectives of the contribution stat-
utes would fail the test of good faith. Citing Riverside Steel,152 the City of
Los Angeles court reasoned that because apportionment of damages was
only one in a host of good faith factors which must be viewed together, a
sliding scale settlement lacking a minimum contribution requirement was
not a bad faith settlement as a matter of law.' 53 The court supported this
conclusion by observing that the settling defendants had undertaken the
risk of a $1,900,000 liability should the City win a defense verdict at trial.
Under such circumstances, an agreement could not be rejected per se
merely because the settling defendants potentially would pay nothing.
That possibility was only one factor to examine in arriving at a good faith
determination.1
54
Having concluded that the sliding scale settlement was not invalid
as a matter of law, the appellate court held that a good faith determina-
tion was factual in nature and should therefore be resolved by the trial
court.'55 As a result, the only concrete rule emanating from the appel-
late decision is that a sliding scale settlement not requiring an uncondi-
tional minimum contribution from each potentially liable defendant does
not necessarily fail the reasonable range test for good faith.
149. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (citing Tech-Bilt, 38
Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985)).
150. Id. at 867, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69.
151. Id. at 868, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
152. See supra note 109-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Riverside Steel.
153. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
154. Id. at 868-70, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 569-70.
155. Id. at 870, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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V. ANALYSIS
By rejecting an unconditional minimum contribution requirement,
the City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 56 Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior
Court,157 and Riverside Steel Construction Co. v. William H. Simpson
Construction Co. 158 courts have effectively allowed courts to ignore the
dictates of Tech-Bilt. As a result, under the guise of encouraging settle-
ment, one defendant, who may have been only minimally liable for a
plaintiff's injury, may be required to pay an entire judgment. The follow-
ing analysis considers whether the legislature intended this potential in-
equity when it enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 877.519 and
whether fairness and efficiency are better promoted by requiring all slid-
ing scale agreements to include an unconditional minimum contribution.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Sliding Scale Settlements
Sliding scale settlements provide several clear benefits. First, they
often provide a plaintiff with an instant source of cash 160 which solves
several immediate problems. For example, a plaintiff in a personal injury
action often needs immediate relief to pay medical and related expenses.
Additionally, the settlement funds enable the plaintiff to finance suits
against nonsettling defendants.' 6' Moreover, sliding scale settlements
encourage at least partial settlement of suits.' 62 A defendant that is able
156. 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), vacating and remanding 160 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984).
157. 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority).
158. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority).
159. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980). See supra notes 94-98.
160. This is true, of course, only if the agreement calls for payment of some of the settle-
ment prior to a final judgment. For example, the agreement in City of Los Angeles provided a
loan to the plaintiffs from the settling defendants to purchase an annuity contract. The loan
would be repaid with any money the plaintiff received in a judgment in excess of the guarantee
amount. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
161. Thornton & Wick, Loan Receipt Agreements: Are They Loans, Settlements, Wagering
Contracts; or Unholy Alliances?, 43 INs. COUNS. J. 226, 227 (1976).
162. Encouraging settlements is a strong public policy in California. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 496, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 265 (1978).
However, it is unclear whether encouraging "partial" settlement is as strong a public policy.
In Sears, the court explained that the simplification of litigation resulting from the presence of
one less joint tortfeasor in a case is a subordinate policy consideration. Id. at 497, 147 Cal.
Rptr. at 264-65. The court in Tech-Built, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs. appeared to agree
that while encouraging total settlement is a primary goal, encouraging partial settlement is
only a subordinate goal. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
See Roberts, supra note 39, at 889-91 nn.202-04; Comment, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18
STAN. L. REV. 486, 489 (1966).
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to reach an agreement with a plaintiff can get out of a suit and limit his
potential liability. Finally, sliding scale settlements protect the plaintiff's
interest by providing for a guarantee of a minimum recovery.163
While providing benefits to the plaintiff and the settling defendants,
sliding scale agreements often exact substantial costs from the nonset-
tling defendant. Initially, the agreement diminishes the chance that the
nonsettlor will be able to reach a settlement with the plaintiff. Because
the plaintiff has just received a cash infusion from his initial settlement,
he is now well funded and quite probably in a "litigatious frame of
mind."' 4 Equipped with a guaranteed minimum recovery, the plaintiff
can hold out for a large settlement from the nonsettling defendant. In
most sliding scale agreements, the plaintiff is prohibited from settling
with the remaining defendant for anything less than the guarantee
amount of the initial agreement.161 Ultimately, sliding scale agreements
may work not to promote settlement but rather to ensure that litigation
will continue.
These agreements also force the remaining defendant to ward off not
only the plaintiff but also the settling defendants who now have a finan-
cial interest in a large judgment. California has partially solved this
problem by requiring disclosure of sliding scale settlements to the court
and often to the jury,166 thus reducing the risk of a settling defendant
fooling the jury by admitting liability at the trial.' 67 However, introduc-
ing a sliding scale agreement into evidence may damage rather than help
the nonsettling defendant. Such agreements can be drafted in a manner
which deters the remaining defendant from submitting it to the jury. For
example, the agreement may contain a preamble which intimates that the
nonsettling defendant, among other things, is primarily responsible for
the injury.'
68
163. See Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980). The
court stated "maximization of recovery to the injured party for the amount of his injury to the
extent fault of others has contributed to it" is first in the hierarchy of interests. Id. at 447, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 56.
164. Thornton & Wick, supra note 161, at 228. This again raises the question of whether
California promotes partial settlement of litigation as a primary public policy. See supra note
162. A recent California decision disputes the claim that the existence of a sliding scale settle-
ment makes total settlement of the action less likely. Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H.
Simpson Constr. Co., 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 791, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, 575, hrg. granted, 709
P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); see supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 877.5 (West 1980).
167. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
168. Thornton & Wick, supra note 161, at 234. These authors point to an agreement with a
preamble accusing the nonsettling defendant of harboring a defiant attitude, of being primarily
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Admitting the agreement into evidence might spawn the related dis-
advantage to the nonsettling defendant of suggesting to the jury that the
plaintiff and the settling defendants are expecting a certain recovery. In
fact, such an agreement indicates that the settling parties are so sure that
the jury will return a verdict for a certain amount they are willing to
guarantee it. Informing the jury of "the settling parties' expectation of a
substantial verdict... will tend to make this expectation a self fulfilling
prophecy.'
169
The final and most costly disadvantage to the nonsettling defendant
is that a sliding scale settlement which meets the requirements of good
faith destroys his right to partial indemnity from his co-defendants. The
settlement may allow the nonsettling parties to escape the judgment free
of charge; there is no right to cross-claim for partial indemnity and the
nonsettling party may pay the entire verdict regardless of her degree of
fault. 170
B. Legislative Intent Behind Section 87Z5
The sliding scale statute enacted by the California Legislature-sec-
tion 877.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure-expressly ad-
dressed only the issue of the secrecy of the agreements, leaving open the
issue of good faith. 17 1 Some courts have read the statute quite narrowly.
For example, in Imperial Spa, Inc. v. Superior Court 172 the court rea-
soned that in approving sliding scale agreements the legislature clearly
rejected the requirement of proportionality for the good faith of such
settlements.17 3 In contrast, the court in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad
responsible for the injury and of being most financially able to pay the judgment. Id. See
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 169-70, 250 N.E.2d 378, 386 (1969).
One author suggests that this problem can be avoided merely by excising any inculpating state-
ments except those absolutely necessary to an understanding of the agreement prior to its
submission into evidence. Comment, supra note 86, at 766-67.
169. Thornton & Wicke, supra note 161, at 234.
170. Note, "Mary Carter" Limitation on LiabilityAgreements Between Adversary Parties: A
Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 988 (1973-74). The author there suggests:
"The salient feature of a Mary Carter agreement is the incentive provision whereby the signing
defendant may decrease the dollar amount of his liability by increasing the dollar amount of
his co-defendants' liability." Id. at 989.
171. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980); see supra notes 94-98 and accompa-
nying text.
172. 205 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1984) (ordered depublished).
173. Id. at 351. The Imperial Spa court also rejected the decision in Torres v. Union Pac.
R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984). Id. Thus, it appears that the court was
speaking of the reasonable range test when they referred to proportionality. See also Young v.
Lane Realty, 158 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1979) (ordered depublished), in which one concurring opinion
states that the only good faith requirement for sliding scale agreements under § 877.5 is disclo-
sure to the court. Young, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Paras, J., concurring).
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CO.,174 held that the sliding scale statute compelled a good faith test
which considered as a factor the relationship between the settlement
price and the settling party's fair share of liability.17 These conflicting
interpretations illustrate the need to explore what, if any, good faith defi-
nition the legislature had in mind for agreements covered by the statute.
This section will explore available evidence concerning the legislative
motives behind section 877.5.
1. Plain meaning
There is no evidence and no case authority to suggest that sliding
scale agreements are exempt from good faith requirements.176 An over-
view of the context in which the statute was enacted clearly indicates that
the legislature did intend such a requirement. First, section 877.5 was
placed among the other good faith statutes."' Section 877 is the statute
which discusses the consequences of a good faith settlement.178 Section
877.6 discusses the proper procedure for determining the good faith of a
pretrial settlement between a joint tortfeasor and a plaintiff.1 79  This
raises the inference that the legislature placed the sliding scale statute
among the other good faith statutes because it is a good faith statute
itself.
More importantly, at the time the legislature passed this legislation
the good faith requirement applied to all settlements which released one
joint tortfeasor from liability for contribution to a co-joint tortfeasor1
80
In enacting section 877.5, the legislature did not abrogate this existing
requirement. Had it intended to change the state of the law, it seems
likely the legislature would have clearly expressed this intent.
Conversely, the language of the statute supports the conclusion that
the legislature did not intend to alter existing law." Section 877.5
merely adds a disclosure requirement in sliding scale cases to the good
faith standard releasing any joint tortfeasor from liability.
174. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
175. Id. at 507, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
176. See supra note 107.
177. The recent opinion in Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co.,
171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985) suggests that the legislature erred in placing
this statute among the contribution statutes. Id. at 796, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
178. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
180. Id. § 877. See River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103
Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
181. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 587-90, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373-74, 128
Cal. Rptr. 427, 429-30 (1976) (discussing statutory construction).
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2. Legislative history
Support for this conclusion comes from available legislative history
pertaining to section 877.5. The Legislative Counsel Digest 82 initially
refers to the fact that in tort actions involving multiple defendants, a
plaintiff may arrange a settlement with some, but not all of the
tortfeasors, which limits the liability of the settling defendants thereby
affecting the liability of the nonsettling defendants. The Digest focused
on the concern that these agreements were not required to be revealed to
the court or to the jury in a subsequent trial.'83 Thus, it appears that the
legislature's sole intent was to remedy the unfairness caused by the secre-
tive nature of sliding scale agreements.'
84
Furthermore, in analyzing the potential effects of section 877.5 in its
bill form-A.B. 1275 8 5-the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary
quoted generously from River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court.86
In particular, the Committee's Bill Digest points to specific language in
that case: "'The major goals of the 1957 tort contribution legislation
are,first, equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and second,
encouragement of settlements.' "18 This legislative documentation thus
182. Cal. A.B. 1275, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977) (Legislative Counsel's Digest).
183. Id.
184. This would correspond with what several other jurisdictions had done regarding slid-
ing scale settlements. See supra note 86.
185. Cal. A.B. 1275, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5
(West 1980)).
186. Settlement of Suits: Bill Digest on AB 1275 Before Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 1977-
78 Reg. Sess. (1977) (unpublished Report) (hearing date: May 12, 1977) (copy on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Assembly Comm. Report].
187. Id. at 1 (quoting River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993-94, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
503) (emphasis added). The Digest continues:
"Auxiliary to the latter is some assurance of settlement finality. Because the statute
limits contribution to the judgment debtors, the concept of equitable sharing stops far
short of equal sharing.... Each prejudgment settlement affects the ultimate expense
borne by each judgment debtor. Absent a prejudgment settlement, all defendants
found liable would share pro rata, that is, equally. By settling before verdict, one
defendant may acquit himself by contributing something less than his equal share,
leaving the other defendants saddled with the settlement, the smaller the pro tanto
credit for the settlement. The cheaper the settlement, the smaller the pro tanto
credit. Thus a nonnegotiating defendant has a palpable financial interest in the
amount at which the negotiating defendant settles.
The California legislation empowers a plaintiff, armed with a strong and lucra-
tive claim, to settle with his antagonists one by one, preserving for the jury the oppo-
nent with the most money and least sympathy. The power is great and vulnerable to
abuse. In a multi-party case the threat of an unshared judgment against the last
remaining defendant--diminished only by meager settlements with his eager fel-
lows-permits a plaintiff to create acute financial pressures bordering on extortion.
Viewed as a demand for settlements which have a reasonable relation to the value of
the plaintiff's case, to the strengths and weaknesses of the parties and the financial
ability of the settlor, the good faith clause aids the statutory goal of equitable sharing.
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refutes any speculation that A.B. 1275 was intended to abrogate the ex-
isting good faith requirements for settlements involving multiple defend-
ants, or that River Garden Farms is inapplicable to sliding scale
settlements.
188
3. Which good faith test does section 877.5 envision?
Assuming that section 877.5 does require good faith, the question
remains as to which good faith test the legislature contemplated.
At the time A.B. 1275 was passed, competing definitions of good
faith existed. The courts in River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior
Court 189 and Lareau v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 190 had enun-
ciated a reasonable range test. However, Stambaugh v. Superior Court 191
had suggested that the appropriate test for good faith was the tortious
conduct test. Stambaugh did not replace River Garden Farms nor
Lareau, it merely disagreed with them. In other words, the definition of
good faith was unclear at the time the legislation was enacted.
The Assembly Judiciary Committee's Bill Digest suggests that the
Legislature specifically contemplated a reasonable range test. Quoting
directly from River Garden Farms, the Digest states that " '[v]iewed as a
demand for settlements which have a reasonable relation to the value of
the plaintiff's case ... the good faith clause aids the statutory goal of
equitable sharing.'"192 Because this legislative material never refers to
the tortious conduct test, the inference arises that the legislature contem-
plated a reasonable range test for good faith.
Therefore, it appears certain that section 877.5 was intended to im-
pose good faith requirements upon sliding scale settlements and that the
It also aids the goal of settlement, by preventing a plaintiff from selecting one defend-
ant as the target for enlarged demands after unreasonably low settlements with
others."
Id. at 1-3 (quoting River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993-94, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04)
(emphasis added by author).
188. This assertion was made in the initial appellate opinion in City of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 497, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674, 680 (1984), vacated and re-
manded, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986) (remanded for further factual find-
ings on good faith issues).
189. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972). See supra notes 41-47 and accompa-
nying text.
190. 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975). See supra notes 48-51 and accompa-
nying text.
191. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985) (disapproving cases which employed tortious conduct test similar to
that employed in Stambaugh). See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
192. Assembly Comm. Report, supra note 186, at 2.
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test contemplated was most probably the reasonable range test articu-
lated in River Garden Farms.
C. How Should Good Faith be Defined?
1. A rejection of the tortius conduct test
In discussing the competing definitions of good faith, it is important
to keep in mind the goals motivating the enactment of the 1957 tort con-
tribution statutes. Those goals were, first, equitable allocation of fault,
and second, encouragement of settlement.1 9 Because the amount of a
good faith settlement is deducted from an ultimate judgment rendered
against the nonsettling parties, 94 the goal of equitable sharing of costs is
served only when the amount of the settlement bears a reasonable rela-
tion to the fair share of the settling party's potential liability. Equitable
sharing of costs is not served when the settlement amount deducted is
egregiously disproportionate to the settling defendant's fair share of po-
tential liability. Yet this result is promoted by the tortious conduct test
which requires only that, in negotiating a settlement, the settling parties
refrain from tortious or collusive conduct with respect to the nonsettling
parties. 195 Because this analysis ignores the goal of equitable sharing of
costs and unfairly burdens a nonsettling party, the tortious conduct test
must be rejected. 196
2. The reasonable range test of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Associates
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,197 the California
Supreme Court for the first time considered the definition of good faith
for settlement agreements where multiple defendants were involved. In
rejecting the tortious conduct test enunciated in Stambaugh v. Superior
193. Id. at 1.
194. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
195. See, eg., Cardio Sys. Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7,
698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985). See infra notes 224-27 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Cardio. For an application of this reasoning in the context of
sliding scale agreements, see Burlington N.R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 946-
47, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (1982), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d
at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
196. The tortious conduct test was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. See infra notes 198-209 and accom-
panying text.
197. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
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Court,198 the Tech-Bilt court held that "[a] more appropriate definition of
'good faith' . . . would enable the trial court to inquire, among other
things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable
range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liabil-
ity for the plaintiff's injuries." 199 The court considered the two primary
policies underlying the good faith statutes: (1) the encouragement of
settlements and (2) the equitable allocation of costs among multiple
tortfeasors2 co It concluded that neither policy would be served by an
approach which emphasized one goal to the virtual exclusion of the
other. The tortious conduct test, as explained by the court, produced
such a result.201
The Tech-Bilt reasonable range test does not require that a settle-
ment be strictly proportionate to the settling party's fair share of liability.
Rather, the test embraced by the court was similar to the one envisioned
in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,z"z which specifically addressed
the good faith of a sliding scale settlement. °3 In approving this settle-
ment, the Torres court concluded that in order to meet statutory good
faith requirements such settlements could "not be grossly disproportion-
ate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would
estimate the settling defendant's liability to be. ' '2°  Embracing this lan-
guage, the Tech-Bilt court placed the burden on the party asserting the
lack of good faith to demonstrate that the settlement is so far "out of the
ballpark" that it is inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the stat-
ute.205 Accordingly, in order to be within the reasonable range, a settle-
ment need not be proportionate to potential liability, but need only be
"somewhere in the ballpark."
Since the agreement examined in Tech-Bilt was not a sliding scale
settlement, the question arises whether the court's holding in that case is
applicable to such agreements. The broad policies underlying the Tech-
Bilt decision indicate that it should extend to all pretrial settlements in
198. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, 38
Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
199. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
200. 38 Cal. 3d at 498, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
201. Id. The court cited Professor Roberts, who suggested that the tortious conduct test
emphasized the goal of encouraging settlements to the virtual exclusion of the goal of equitable
sharing of costs. Roberts, supra note 39, at 898.
202. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984). See supra notes 52-55 and accompa-
nying text.
203. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 503-10, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 828-33.
204. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
205. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500-01, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
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cases involving multiple tortfeasors. The supreme court in Tech-Bilt
enunciated a general definition of "good faith" in the context of pretrial
settlements. It did not distinguish between types of agreements nor did it
limit its holding to only those agreements similar in terms to the one
before it.
Furthermore, in Tech-Bilt, the supreme court specifically "disap-
proved" two cases which employed a tortious conduct analysis to deter-
mine the good faith of sliding scale agreements.20 6 Had the court
intended to exclude sliding scale settlements from its holding, it could
have refrained from reversing cases that arose from such agreements.
Finally, in conjunction with its decision in Tech-Bilt, the supreme
court remanded several sliding scale cases to the appellate court that had
previously been accepted for hearings.207 It ordered the appellate courts
to reconsider their decisions in light of the applicability of the principles
enunciated in Tech-Bilt. This action, read together with the court's rejec-
tion of Dompeling v. Superior Court,20 8 and Burlington Northern Railroad
Co. v. Superior Court,20 9 indicates that the court intended lower courts to
apply a reasonable range analysis to sliding scale settlements.
D. Creating a Workable Reasonable Range Test to Determine the
Good Faith of Sliding Scale Settlements
The California Supreme Court's decision in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates21° settled one controversy but generated an-
other. The court adopted a general definition of good faith without
specifying the structure a settlement must take in order to comply with
its definition. This section will discuss the difficulties which arise in de-
termining whether a sliding scale settlement is in good faith and will pro-
pose guidelines for the court in making these determinations.
206. Id. at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7 (disapproving Dompeling
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981) and Burlington N.R.R. v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982)).
207. Abbott Ford Inc. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg.
granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176
Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), vacating and remanding 160 Cal. App. 3d 489,
206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984).
208. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at
500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
209. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at
500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
210. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). See supra notes 64-72 & 198-
205 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tech-Bilt.
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1. Practicality of a reasonable range test
A few cases and certain commentators have addressed the issue of
how a court, mechanically, could determine if a settlement was within
the "reasonable range" of a settling party's potential liability before a
verdict has ever been rendered. The court in River Garden Farms, Inc. v.
Superior Court suggested, and the Tech-Bilt court agreed, that "'price
levels are not as unpredictable as one might suppose.... [G]eneralized
valuation criteria are recognized by the personal injury bar.., and [by]
pretrial settlement courts.' "211 These courts concluded that, prior to a
trial on liability, reliable estimates of the value of a claim and the degree
of culpability of each tortfeasor can be made. Therefore, a reasonable
range can be established prior to trial.
212
The court in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.213 took an even
more flexible view of the practical problems involved in making such a
determination prior to trial. The court suggested that the value the jury
ultimately assigns to the claim against a settling party should not be used
in determining the reasonable range.21 4 The court reasoned that a de-
fendant may in good faith believe that his liability is less than the jury
ultimately determines it to be. It adopted a test whereby the settlement
figure "must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable man,
at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's lia-
bility to be."'12 1' The Torres court would rely on the liability estimates of
plaintiffs and defendants who are likely to have little experience making
such determinations.
One commentator has proposed a minor adjustment to the reason-
211. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting River
Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506
(1972)). One commentator has suggested:
Some litigators may point to the apparent difficulty of predicting percentages of ulti-
mate responsibility at the pretrial stage as a major drawback to granting proportional
effect to settlements. Both the percentages of responsibility and the probable amount
of plaintiff's damages must be determined before a fair value can be set. However, as
experienced trial lawyers know, both the plaintiff's bar and the defendant's bar have
been making such 'informed guesses' for years. The trial bar's unflagging resort to
settlements has produced highly refined techniques that make actual litigation still a
matter of last resort.
Adams, Settlement After Li: But is it "Fair"?, 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 747-48 (1979). Adams noted
that seminars are run continually, discussing the valuation of claims and settlements prior to
trial, and also suggested other sources of guidance. Id. at 747-48 nn.17-18. See also River
Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998 n.9, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.9.
212. This is important to the settling defendant who wants to be certain that his settlement
will hold regardless of what is subsequently decided at trial.
213. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
214. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
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able range test set forth in Torres by suggesting it would work better as a
"reasonable judge" test.216 Through their experience, judges can make
rough estimates of a plaintiff's probable recovery and a defendant's de-
gree of fault. The commentator reasoned that defendants, anxious to
have their settlements approved (thus insulating them from cross-claims
for partial indemnity) would compile the evidence necessary to illustrate
that their settlements meet reasonable range requirements. Moreover,
the nonsettling defendants, concerned with protecting their right to par-
tial indemnity, would produce evidence to the contrary.217 As a result,
the judge would possess sufficient information to estimate whether a set-
tlement survived a reasonable range analysis.
In her lone dissent in Tech-Bilt, Chief Justice Bird argued that em-
ploying a reasonable range test is impractical. The Chief Justice feared
that forcing judges to determine, prior to trial, whether settlements are
within a reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of potential
liability "will clog our trial courts with unnecessary hearings," placing an
intolerable burden upon them.2 According to the Chief Justice, it is
unworkable and inefficient to force trial judges to determine the value of
a plaintiff's claim, assess the degree of each defendant's fault, and con-
sider other factors which might be germane to a reasonable range analy-
sis, all prior to trial.219
Although the Chief Justice expressed a legitimate concern, this
problem does not compel the adoption of a test for good faith which
completely ignores the respective liabilities of the parties. Courts have
consistently identified equitable sharing of costs as one of the two pri-
mary goals behind the California tort contribution acts.220 This policy
has been set by the legislature and it is unacceptable for a court to an-
nounce that it does not have the time to properly enforce the law.
More importantly, courts previously employing a reasonable range
analysis have been able to do so without encountering insurmountable
obstacles. These courts have followed a practical approach considering
such factors as the evidence of the liability of the parties,22" ' the testimony
216. See Roberts, supra note 39, at 922-23.
217. Id.
218. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502, 698 P.2d at 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
219. Id. at 505-06, 698 P.2d at 171, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 268 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (citing River Garden Farms, 26 Cal,
App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503).
221. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 807, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1981),
disapproved, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal Rptr. at 264 n.7.
Although the Dompeling court embraced the tortious conduct test, it proceeded to state that
1030
May 1986] SLIDING SETTLEMENTS & GOOD FAITH
of witnesses evaluating the value of the casez"' and the experience of the
presiding judge.223 In Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court,2 24 for ex-
ample, the trial court employed a reasonable range analysis to determine
the good faith of a pretrial settlement.225 In Cardio, the plaintiffs were
the wife and children of a man who died during open heart surgery.
They sued the hospital and Cardio Systems, the distributor of a heart-
lung pump machine which was a contributing factor in the man's
death. 2 6 The plaintiffs settled with Cardio Systems for the minimal con-
sideration of a waiver of costs. The plaintiffs then settled with the hospi-
tal for $1,000,000. The hospital filed a cross-complaint against Cardio
Systems for partial indemnity. Cardio claimed that its settlement with
the plaintiff was in good faith, thus insulating it from any liability to its
co-defendant. In determining that the settlement price did not bear a
reasonable relationship to the settling party's fair share of potential liabil-
ity, the trial court-which was subsequently reversed-considered evi-
dence presented as to liability and evaluation of damages.2 27
Each court employing a reasonable range analysis faced the same
problems courts would face today: estimation of a defendant's ultimate
liability prior to trial. All were able to make such a determination and
there is no reason to expect that judges today could not accomplish this
task just as efficiently under the reasonable range test mandated by Tech-
Bilt.228 A good faith hearing need not be as cumbersome as Chief Justice
Bird suggests. A judge may make his determination on the basis of affi-
the settlement in question was not "'unreasonably cheap'" in light of the plaintiff's total
settlement request. Id.
222. Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 883-84, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254,
256 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
264 n.7. See also Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 58, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 136, 145 (1984).
223. Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 328, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 82 (1983),
disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 264 n.7. Although the Kohn court embraced a tortious conduct approach, it approved the
trial court's good faith determination using reasonable range standards. Id.
224. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
225. Id. at 886, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
226. Id. at 882, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
227. Id. at 883-84, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 256. It is significant that the Cardlo court, which
reluctantly reversed the trial court on appeal, noted the unfairness of the settlement. The
hospital lost its right to partial indemnity against Cardio Systems merely because Cardio Sys-
tems and the plaintiff had negotiated an agreement allowing Cardio Systems to settle for much
less than its potential liability. As a result, the hospital was required to shoulder the burden
for almost the entire verdict. Id. at 890-91, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
228. For a discussion of the reasonable range test in operation, see Roberts, supra note 39,
at 924-28.
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davits alone. No oral testimony is required by the statute.229
2. Factors to be considered in a reasonable range analysis
Beginning with the earliest decisions on good faith, the courts have
struggled to determine what factors to consider in a reasonable range
analysis.2 30 They have recognized that the goal of encouraging settle-
ments will, in most cases, require that a settlement be lower than what
the tortfeasor would expect to pay if he went to trial and lost.231 Courts
have also recognized the difficulties in computing a reasonable range be-
cause most cases permit only a rough assessment of value in advance of a
trial.
232
Courts using the reasonable range test do not require that settle-
ments equal what the settlor would have paid had he gone to trial and
lost. As the Torres court stated, "any moderate disparity between a de-
fendant's settlement price and his fair share of the damages will be toler-
ated .... In some cases, however, the disparity between what was paid
and what is fair will be so egregious as to constitute bad faith .... ,,233
Courts should therefore employ a definition of reasonable range which
balances the goals of equitable sharing of costs and encouraging settle-
ment of litigation. This section will discuss the factors courts should
consider in determining whether a sliding scale settlement is within the
reasonable range of the settling party's potential liability.
a. minimum contribution
The good faith requirement, as enunciated by the supreme court in
Tech-Bilt, should bar any sliding scale settlement that allows a tortfeasor
to shield himself from a cross-claim for partial indemnity and still escape
the suit without contributing to a final judgment.2 34 Accordingly, courts
should require defendants entering into sliding scale settlements to con-
tribute to any judgment ultimately rendered an amount within their rea-
sonable range of potential liability. If a settling defendant is allowed to
escape the action without contributing at all to the ultimate award, the
remaining defendant, though only partially at fault, would be required to
229. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
230. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text discussing the reasonable range test for
good faith.
231. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
232. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Cf. Adams, supra
note 211, at 747-48.
233. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
234. For examples, see supra notes 76, 110-11 & 141-48 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the agreements in Burlington Northern, Riverside Steel and City of Los Angeles.
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pay the entire award. Recognizing the dual goals of the tort contribution
statutes, the Tech-Bilt court stated that these policies "would be dis-
served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of
the other." '235 A sliding scale settlement with no unconditional minimum
contribution requirement is precisely the type of agreement which em-
phasizes the goal of encouraging settlement to the exclusion of the goal of
equitable sharing of costs.236
Sliding scale agreements which do ensure that the settling party will
contribute an amount within the reasonable range of his fair share of
potential liability promote the policy of equitable sharing of costs. Under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 the amount of the settle-
ment will be deducted from the damage award against the remaining de-
fendant.237 If the settlement meets the reasonable range test the
remaining defendant, after deducting the settlement from a judgment
rendered against him, will be paying a sum reasonably related to his fair
share of liability.
One court has suggested that the present value of a sliding scale
settlement be considered in determining whether the agreement is within
the reasonable range of the settlor's potential liability. In Riverside Steel
Construction Co. v. William H. Simpson Construction Co.,238 a case de-
cided after Tech-Bilt, the court of appeal rejected the proposition that
sliding scale settlements, to be in good faith, require a minimum contri-
bution by the settling defendant. The court reasoned that a guarantee to
the plaintiff of a certain recovery had a present value similar to that of an
insurance policy which could bring the settlement amount within the rea-
sonable range of the settling party's fair share of liability.239
The Riverside Steel court reasoned that a strict minimum contribu-
235. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (citing Roberts,
supra note 39, at 899).
236. This type of an agreement encourages settlement by providing the settling defendant a
possibility of escaping the action without contributing to the final judgment. Yet it ignores the
goal of equitable allocation of cost. Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 877, the
amount of a good faith settlement is subtracted from any judgment rendered against the re-
maining defendants. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). By requiring the settlement
price to be within a reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of liability, the code
ensures that the remaining defendants are not unduly burdened by paying a disproportionate
share of the damage award. However, when a settling defendant can escape the action without
any payment, there is nothing to deduct from the ultimate verdict and the nonsettling defend-
ant unjustly pays more than her share of the fault.
237. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
238. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985). See supra notes 109-18 and accom-
panying text.
239. Id. at 794-95, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577. See infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the minimum contribution concept and its place in a reasonable range analysis.
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tion requirement would render sliding scale settlements valueless to the
settling parties."4 This might be true if the minimum contribution test is
one of "strict proportionality," in which case the minimum payment
would have to equal the settling party's fair share of liability. Under
such a test it would make no sense for a joint tortfeasor to settle whether
it be a straight settlement or a sliding scale settlement. Under a reason-
able range test, however, several factors are considered241 which would
allow the minimum contribution to fall below the settling party's actual
proportionate share of liability. Because the party could still settle for
less than he would pay if found liable at a trial, sliding scale settlements
would still be of some value to defendants in suits with multiple
defendants.
The Riverside Steel court's analysis is not without merit. Because of
the structure of sliding scale settlements, the settling defendant usually
would guarantee the plaintiff an amount far in excess of his potential
liability. Considering the requirement that a minimum contribution be
reasonably related to the settlor's potential liability, the settlor would be
foolish to also guarantee an amount significantly higher. It appears the
settling party generally would be better off with a straight settlement.
However, this is not necessarily so. The settling defendant could struc-
ture the sliding scale settlement so as to require an upward cap governing
what he ultimately might be required to pay, which would still be lower
than what he might expect to pay at a trial.242
An example of a sliding scale settlement consistent with this propo-
sal and consistent with the dictates of Tech-Bilt is the agreement upheld
in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.243 In Torres, the plaintiff and one
defendant negotiated a sliding scale settlement with a guarantee amount
of $200,000. Fifty thousand dollars of this was an outright settlement
which the plaintiff could keep regardless of what he recovered against the
240. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 795-96, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
241. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
242. For example, assume that the settling party estimates its liability at $250,000 in an
action worth approximately $1,000,000 to the plaintiff. Concluding an agreement requiring a
minimum contribution of $250,000 in addition to a $1,000,000 guarantee would be ludicrous
from the settling party's perspective. However, using a reasonable range analysis it is conceiv-
able that a court might approve a settlement of $125,000 as a good faith settlement. The
settling party could thus agree to contribute $125,000 and be liable for an additional $50,000
depending on the outcome of the litigation with the remaining defendants. In larger suits there
would be even more room in which to structure such a sliding scale.
On the other hand, one author, without specifically rejecting the idea of a minimum con-
tribution, opined that sliding scale settlements could not meet the dictates of good faith in
California, whatever the specific form. Wesierski, Mary Carter Agreements And Good Faith
Settlements-Are They Both Possible In California?, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 639, 648 (1981).
243. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
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remaining defendant at the trial." Under Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 877, this $50,000 would be deducted from any judgment ultimately
rendered against the remaining defendant.245 Since the court determined
that $50,000 was within the reasonable range of the settling defendant's
fair share of liability, the nonsettling defendant would not be forced to
pay egregiously more than his degree of fault compelled. This is much
more equitable than the zero contribution requirement approved in Riv-
erside Steel, 46 in which the nonsettling defendant might be forced to pay
the entire verdict despite the fact he is only partially at fault.
The Torres case illustrates that a good faith test requiring an actual
minimum contribution encourages equitable apportionment of liability
without stifling the incentive to settle. Defendants seeking an end to liti-
gation at a price less than they would have paid had they lost at trial will
still settle out of court, as did the defendant in Torres.247 Since both
defendants in Torres ultimately settled, the case also indicates that a min-
imum contribution requirement does not necessarily deter total settle-
ment of a suit. Finally, the Torres case supports the proposition that a
trial court can hear evidence and make a judgment as to whether a settle-
ment is within a defendant's fair share of liability even though the case
has not yet been tried.
b. other factors
Courts should consider several additional factors when determining
whether a minimum contribution falls within the reasonable range of the
settling defendant's fair share of liability. First, courts will have to deter-
mine the plaintiff's potential recovery and estimate what portion of that
recovery the settling tortfeasor would be held responsible for had he gone
to trial. The court should then employ a discount factor so that the set-
tlement is allowed to fall sufficiently below the defendant's proportionate
liability to maintain the attractiveness to defendants to settle prior to
trial.248 As the Torres court stated, any "moderate disparity" between
the settlement amount and the actual liability will be tolerated.249
244. Id. at 503, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
245. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
246. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
247. One might speculate that this minimum contribution would induce the nonsettling
party to take his chances at trial knowing that at least the minimum contribution will be
deducted from any verdict against him. However, this is not necessarily so. In the Torres case,
both parties ultimately settled. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 828. Thus,
the minimum contribution did not impede total settlement of the suit.
248. See Roberts, supra note 39, at 920.
249. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830. See also River Garden Farms,
Ina v. Superior Court, where the court stated, "[w]hen one tortfeasor chooses to settle and
1035
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:995
The Tech-Bilt court mentioned factors which might also be consid-
ered in a good faith determination. It recognized that disproportionately
low settlement figures are often reasonable in the case of relatively insol-
vent or underinsured tortfeasors.250 Although allowing an insolvent or
underinsured tortfeasor to settle for an amount substantially below his
share of liability shifts an otherwise unacceptable proportion of the ver-
dict to the nonsettling defendant, it is a practical consideration which
should not be ignored. Because his co-defendant is insolvent, the nonset-
tling party's right to partial indemnity is of limited value. Abrogating it
does not egregiously offend the goal of equitable sharing of costs.
2 I
Judges might also consider the skills of the attorneys on both sides
because this will affect the judges' evaluation of the plaintiff's recovery
and the likely proportion of damages for which the settling defendant
might be held liable at trial.
The inclusion of some of these factors might circumvent the purpose
of the reasonable range test. Tech-Bilt rejected the tortious conduct test
because it cut off one tortfeasor's right to partial indemnity while expos-
ing him to liability for a judgment grossly disproportionate to his fair
share of liability. If, under the reasonable range test, judges are permit-
ted to make subjective decisions on a host of factors that make lower
settlements look reasonable, once again the goal of equitable allocation of
costs will be adversely affected.
However, keeping in mind the value of pretrial settlements to cer-
tain plaintiffs2 2 and the circumstances under which many are negoti-
ated,253 settlements should not be made so unattractive as to dissuade
another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith." River
Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
250. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3 at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. If the court consid-
ers the solvency of a tortfeasor in its good faith determination certain discovery problems arise.
California discovery rules place restrictions on the purposes for which a party's financial con-
dition may be discovered. If financial condition is to be considered in a reasonable range
analysis, the courts will be compelled to allow discovery to ascertain the true state of the
settling party's financial condition. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see F. Rob-
erts, The Financial Condition and Insurance Policy Limits of a Joint Tortfeasor Wishing to
Settle in Good Faith: Problems of Discovery and Confidentiality, (Oct. 1985) (unpublished
manuscript) (to be published in 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
251. For a discussion of indemnity issues where one tortfeasor is insolvent or underinsured,
see Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Amplification of
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 775, 817-31
(1981); Myse, The Problem of the Insolvent Contributor, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 891, 898-905
(1976-77).
252. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text discussing the benefits of sliding scale
settlements.
253. Situations may arise where several defendants are cooperative during settlement nego-
tiations but one or more defendants are not willing to settle. Those not wishing to settle may
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parties from pursuing them. As the court in River Garden Farms stated:
"When one tortfeasor chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate settle-
ment does not signalize bad faith." '254 Just as the tortious conduct test is
unfair because it completely ignores and undermines a joint tortfeasor's
right to partial indemnity, a reasonable range test which ignores the
plaintiff's right to settle would be equally unfair. The courts should not
fashion a test which extinguishes the benefits both defendants and plain-
tiffs would obtain from settling. The factors enumerated above, while
not solving all the problems, balance these competing concerns.
3. Encouraging settlements
A reasonable range test would still provide incentives for a defend-
ant to settle. As mentioned, a settling party would still pay less in a
settlement than he would if found liable at a trial. Certain factors would
be considered in discounting his settlement price. The incentive is not as
strong as it would be under the tortious conduct test. Nevertheless, the
reasonable range test is more consistent with the legislative goals of en-
couraging settlements and equitable allocation of costs.
E. An Analysis of the Sliding Scale Agreements in Riverside Steel,
Abbott and City of Los Angeles Under a Reasonable Range
Test for Good Faith
The court in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court255 did not employ
a reasonable range analysis to determine good faith. Instead, it returned
the case to the trial court for a good faith analysis in keeping with the
principles articulated by the supreme court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates.256 Meanwhile, the courts in Riverside Steel
Construction Co. v. William H. Simpson Construction Co.2" 7 and Abbott
Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court258 incorrectly applied the test articulated by
have valid reasons. However, rules rendering partial settlements void of any benefits at all
should be scrutinized carefully. For an example of a situation where one of several defendants
in an action refused to seriously negotiate a settlement, see City of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986).
254. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
255. 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), vacating and remanding 160 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984).
256. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
257. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority). See supra notes 109-26 and
accompanying text.
258. 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985) (opinion to remain published and citable as authority). See supra notes 127-36 and
accompanying text.
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the Tech-Bilt court and upheld sliding scale settlements which should
have been rejected. A brief review of the concurring opinions in the
initial City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court25 9 decision and the opinions
in Riverside Steel and Abbott helps illustrate the deficiencies inherent in
many sliding scale settlement agreements.2 60
As the two concurring opinions in City of Los Angeles pointed out,
there was little ground to assert that the agreement in that case met the
requirements of a reasonable range test.261 Judge Lui found that the
sliding scale recovery agreement was "inconsistent with the dictates of
Torres v. Union Pacific R.R. Co."'262 He stressed that Torres compelled
settling defendants who wished to insulate themselves from cross-claims
for partial indemnity to make an attempt to place the price of the settle-
ment within a reasonable range of potential liability. He concluded that
this settlement did not satisfy that requirement.263
Judge Danielson emphatically argued that, "[w]here settling joint
tortfeasors concede [as in this case] that a figure of $1,900,000 is not
disproportionate to their share of liability, it is difficult to understand
how a zero payment could be considered as not disproportionate to that
same liability. '' 261 Furthermore, he continued, "[t]o say that $1,900,000
is not disproportionate to the settling defendants' potential liability is not
the same as to say that a zero payment would not be disproportionate.
In fact, such a zero payment might well be grossly disproportionate. '265
He concluded by observing that there is a lack of justice in a rule which
permits one defendant to shoulder the entire burden of a judgment result-
ing from an injury for which two or more defendants were responsible.
266
The primary argument advanced to justify sliding scale agreements
with no unconditional minimum contribution requirement is that the
present value of these agreements bring them within a reasonable range
259. 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984), hrg. granted, Nov. 21, 1984, trans-
ferred, Minutes of California Supreme Court, July 18, 1985, 39 Cal. 3d. Advance Sheets, No.
23 (Aug. 22, 1985), at 18 (in light of principles enunciated in Tech-Bilt), vacated and re-
manded, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986).
260. The terms of the agreement in City of LosAngeles are set out supra in notes 141-48 and
accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text discussing the agreement.
262. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 500, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Lui, J.,
concurring).
263. Id. (Lui, J., concurring). This is presumably because the agreement allows the settling
defendants to escape the action while paying nothing.
264. Id. at 502, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Danielson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
265. Id. (Danielson, I., concurring) (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 503, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (Danielson, J., concurring) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971)).
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of the settlor's liability. In its brief to the California Supreme Court, one
of the settling defendants asserted that the agreement in City of Los Ange-
les met reasonable range standards because of its present value prior to
litigation and because of the amount the settling parties may be required
to pay out in the future.26 It based this argument on two grounds.
First, it contended that the agreement acted as an insurance policy which
protected the plaintiff from the risk of losing at trial.268 The agreement
thus assured the plaintiff at least a minimum recovery. Second, the hos-
pital contended that the value of the agreement was enhanced because it
provided substantial immediate relief to a plaintiff who otherwise would
be required to wait years for litigation to produce the same result.269
Inherent problems surface with the present value contention. To
determine whether the value of this "policy" is within the reasonable
range of the settling party's fair share of the liability, the judge would
need to know the agreement's dollar value. Thus, a system for measuring
the present value, in terms of dollars and cents, would have to be devised.
If such a system were devised, and the judge could establish the agree-
ment's dollar value, then, to be consistent with Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates, 70 this dollar value would have to be subtracted
from the ultimate damage award.27 1 A reasonable range test for settle-
ments in multiple tortfeasor cases is only effective if the amount of the
settlement is deducted from the award at trial, thus preventing a dispro-
portionate shift of liability to the nonsettling party. 2
In Riverside Steel the court inferred that the sliding scale agreement
it analyzed had a present value as an insurance policy which should be
considered in determining whether the agreement was within the reason-
267. Brief to California Supreme Court for Appellee Hospital at 13, City of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, No. L.A. 32000 (Cal. S. Ct. filed Oct. 9, 1984), hrg. granted, Nov. 21, 1984,
transferred, Minutes of California Supreme Court, July 18, 1985, 39 Cal. 3d Advance Sheets,
No. 23 (Aug. 22, 1985), at 18 (in light of principles enunciated in Tech-Bilt), vacated and
remanded, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986).
268. The hospital's brief indicated a likelihood that the defendants would prevail at trial.
Hospital's Brief, supra note 267, at 13.
269. Id.
270. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). See supra notes 200-01 and
accompanying text.
271. This present value could be considered the settling defendants minimum contribution.
272. For example, assume a judge determines that the present value of the sliding scale
agreement is within the reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of liability. This
present value must be deducted from any judgment rendered against the nonsettling defend-
ants. If it is not, the remaining defendants will be required to pay all the damages for the
plaintiff's injuries despite the availability of other potentially liable defendants. This is exactly
the kind of situation the contribution statutes, as interpreted by American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), are designed to avoid.
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able range of the settling defendant's fair share of liability. 2 7 3 Neverthe-
less, the court failed to resolve the key issue: whether this amount should
be deducted from the judgment the nonsettling defendant eventually
might have to pay.
Parties should recognize the effect generated when the present value
of a settlement is deducted from the final damage award. This insurance
policy may come at a cost to them. For example, suppose the plaintiff
sues X and Y for a personal injury where total liability equals $40,000.
The plaintiff and X negotiate a sliding scale agreement whereby X guar-
antees the plaintiff a $40,000 recovery and agrees to contribute a $5000
minimum to any damage award. The court then assesses the present
value of the agreement as an insurance policy at $1000 and approves it as
a good faith settlement.274 If the jury returned a verdict against Y for
$40,000, the $6000 ($5000 + $1000) should be deducted from that ver-
dict.275 The plaintiff would receive $39,000276 and, in essence, pay $1000
for his insurance policy. On the other hand, plaintiffs could argue that
the value of the agreement as an insurance policy was part of the settle-
ment and should be paid by the settling defendant. This important issue
should be addressed in any sliding scale settlement.
Both the Riverside Steel and Abbott courts rendered decisions ap-
proving the good faith of sliding scale agreements in light of the princi-
ples enunciated in the Tech-Bilt decision. Neither decision, however,
appears to take the reasonable range test or the goal of equitable alloca-
tion of costs seriously.
In Riverside Steel,27 7 the court approved a sliding scale agreement
even though the settling defendant could potentially escape the action
without contributing to any damage award. The court reached this re-
273. Riverside Steel, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
274. Of course, the court would have to determine whether that $6000 was within the rea-
sonable range of X's fair share of liability.
275. The $5000 settlement amount must be deducted from any damage award. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). As explained in the immediately preceding section, see supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text, this code should be interpreted to compel deduction of the
present value from any damage award where that value is included in a reasonable range
determination. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
276. The plaintiff would receive $34,000 [40,000 - 6000] from Y. Since X guaranteed a
$40,000 recovery he would be required to pay the $6000 difference between the $40,000 guar-
antee and the $34,000 paid by Y. Because the court determined that the "insurance policy"
given by X had a $1000 value, X could argue he need only pay the plaintiff $5000, reducing
plaintiff's cash recovery to $39,000. In cases where the claimed damages were much larger,
the value of a sliding scale agreement as an insurance policy would also become much larger.
It would be very important to work out who was paying for the plaintiff's "insurance"
coverage.
277. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
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suit despite its recognition that Tech-Bilt and the reasonable range test
were applicable to the agreement. The Riverside Steel court stated:
Where... a nonsettling defendant is able to prove that the total
value of a sliding scale recovery agreement.., is not 'in the
ballpark' of the settling defendants proportionate share of lia-
bility, and that figure is viewed together with other factors em-
phasized by the Tech-Bilt court, that 'settlement' may be in bad
faith.278
The Riverside Steel court held that sliding scale settlements with no
unconditional minimum contribution requirements were not per se inva-
lid. It also noted that such agreements had a present value as an insur-
ance policy. The present value, presumably, could bring the settlement
within the reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of potential
liability.279 Unfortunately, the Riverside Steel court did not resolve sev-
eral crucial issues generated by its decision: (1) the present value of the
agreement; (2) how a court evaluates such a present value to determine if
it is within the reasonable range of the settling party's fair share of the
potential liability; and (3) whether, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 877,280 this present value would be deducted from any damage
award rendered against the nonsettling defendant.281 Because answers to
278. Id. at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (emphasis in original).
279. Id. at 794-95, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
280. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text for a discussion of California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.
281. Another recent decision upholding sliding scale settlements not requiring a defined
unconditional minimum contribution is Rogers & Wells v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d
545, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1985). In Rogers & Wells, the court cited with approval the analysis
adopted in Riverside Steel, ignoring a minimum contribution requirement. Id. at 554, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 773. However, in its application of the reasonable range analysis, the Rogers & Wells
court was consistent with the principles articulated in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). Initially, the court assessed
the probability that the settling parties would be found liable at a trial. Estimating this
probability to be very low, the court quoted the trial court's finding that the settling parties'
liability was "as close to zero as you can get." Rogers & Wells, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 220
Cal. Rptr. at 769. Considering these circumstances, a sliding scale settlement demanding any
contribution from the settlors would appear to reasonably reflect their fair share of potential
liability. As the Rogers & Wells court correctly noted, this settlement had a present monetary
value derived from the requirement that the settling parties advance the plaintiffs a portion of
the guarantee amount. Although this was to be repaid out of any judgment collected by the
plaintiffs, the present use of the money was valuable to the plaintiffs, and the loss of the use of
that money represented a contribution by the settling parties. Hence, this settlement appears
to meet the good faith-reasonable range demands enunciated in Tech-Bilt.
A more significant issue raised in Rogers & Wells relates to burden of proof. As the court
correctly noted, settlements presented to the court are presumed to be good faith settlements.
The burden of illustrating that an agreement fails good faith standards falls upon the party
challenging the agreement. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986). This concept
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these crucial questions were not provided, it appears that Riverside Steel
represents an improper application of the reasonable range analysis
adopted by the supreme court in Tech-Bilt.
A more troubling, and even less clear decision is Abbott Ford, Inc. v.
Superior Court.282 To recap the facts in that case, a woman was seriously
injured when a tire from an oncoming van crashed through her wind-
shield. She and one of several defendants executed a sliding scale settle-
ment which required no unconditional minimum contribution. 283
Addressing the pivotal issue in dispute, apportionment of damages,
the Abbott court began by stating that "ultimate disproportionate alloca-
tion in and of itself was not necessarily a mark of bad faith. ' 284 The
court further reasoned that, under certain circumstances, a sliding scale
is easily applied to straight settlements because there is a fixed settlement price which the
nonsettling party can identify to illustrate that the value of the settlement does not reasonably
reflect the settling party's fair share of liability. However, when a sliding scale settlement
contains no defined unconditional minimum contribution, the issue becomes more complex.
The Rogers & Wells court opined that it was incumbent upon the nonsettling parties to factu-
ally illustrate the value of the sliding scale agreement and, further, to demonstrate that this
value was not within the reasonable range of the settling parties fair share of potential liability.
Rogers & Wells, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74.
Obvious analytical difficulties emanate from the court's analysis. In the Rogers & Wells
case itself, the nonsettling parties asserted that because the agreement required no uncondi-
tional minimum contribution, it had no value and therefore could not be a good faith settle-
ment. The court rejected this "simplistic" contention. It reasoned that, to carry their burden
of proof, the parties challenging the good faith of a sliding scale settlement must assess the
value of the agreement and illustrate that that value is not within the reasonable range of the
settling parties' potential liability. Id. Since the nonsettling parties had not done so, they had
not carried their burden of proof on the good faith issue.
As in Riverside Steel, the Rogers & Wells court never assessed the value of the sliding scale
settlement. One must assume, then, that no deduction will be made from any judgment ulti-
mately rendered against the nonsettling defendants. In effect, the court is saying that the
agreement has no value. For, if it did, that value would be deducted from any judgment
ultimately returned against the nonsettling parties pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 877
(West 1980).
A better analysis in sliding scale cases would place the burden on the settling parties to
demonstrate the value of the agreement. Since the agreement addresses the specific needs of
the settlors, they are in a better position to judge its value. They also will be careful to accu-
rately estimate the value because it will ultimately be deducted from their judgment against the
nonsettlors. Once a value is determined, the burden should then shift to the nonsettling parties
to show that this value does not reasonably reflect the settling parties' fair share of liability.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6 should be amended to reflect this proposal.
282. 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, hrg. granted, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1985). See supra notes 123-38 discussing Abbott.
283. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
284. Abbott, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 684, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 611. The court cites Tech-Bilt for
this proposition. Id. If by this the Abbott court means that a settlement may be within a
tortfeasor's reasonable range, though grossly disproportionate to his fair share of liability, it
would be a very strained and certainly improper reading of Tech-Bilt. See Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.
3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
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agreement which required no minimum payment from a settling defend-
ant is not inconsistent with the goal of equitable allocation of costs. Such
circumstances, the court concluded, existed in this case. Abbott had of-
fered to pay seventy percent of a settlement if all defendants would agree
to settle. Their efforts to settle were rejected by the other defendants.
28 5
Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case were in great need of funds imme-
diately. Therefore, the agreement would serve the practical interests of
both parties.286 Abbott would avoid exposure to further liability at trial
and the plaintiffs would get desperately needed cash. However, nowhere
in the opinion does the court explain whether or how the agreement is
within the reasonable range of the settling defendant's fair share of po-
tential liability as specifically mandated by Tech-Bilt.287 Like the court
in Riverside Steel, the Abbott court ignored this crucial issue. Although
these courts claim to be following Tech-Bilt, they bypass critical steps
necessary to properly employ the reasonable range test embraced by that
decision.
Abbott also illustrates the inequity possible when sliding scale agree-
ments require no minimum contribution. In initial settlement negotia-
tions, Abbott offered to pay seventy percent of a settlement if a total
settlement could be negotiated.2"8 Abbott thus admitted responsibility
for a large part of the plaintiff's injury. It is difficult to understand, then,
how an agreement which might release Abbott from liability to the plain-
tiffs and its co-defendants without requiring any contribution from them
toward a potential damage award serves the goal of equitable apportion-
ment of loss. The validity of the agreement becomes even more dubious
in light of the Tech-Bilt court's statement that "a prime value in encour-
aging settlement lies in 'remov[ing the case] from the judicial system, and
this occurs only when all claims relating to the loss are settled.' "29 The
agreement approved in Abbott ignores both the goal of equitable appor-
tionment of loss and that of encouraging total settlement. Yet Tech-Bilt
stressed that these are precisely the two goals that should be served in
285. Abbott, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The court conceded that
Abbott faced great exposure to liability if the case went to trial. Id. at 684, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
611.
286. Id. at 684-85, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
287. Without knowing this, it is impossible to determine the price of the settlement, i.e., the
amount to deduct from any judgment rendered against the remaining defendants pursuant to
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
288. A total settlement is a settlement between all the parties to the action. Abbott, 172 Cal.
App. 3d at 679, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
289. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting Roberts,
supra note 39, at 888-89) (emphasis added by the court).
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determining good faith.2 90
A better solution to Abbott's problem is to allow it to settle with the
plaintiff for an amount reasonably related to its fair share of liability.
This could be accomplished if Abbott agreed to contribute an amount to
any judgment rendered against the remaining defendants which met the
requirements of the reasonable range test. Abbott is rewarded because a
reasonable range analysis permits a settling party to settle for less than
they would be required to pay at trial. Moreover, it protects the nonset-
tling defendants from having to pay an amount grossly disproportionate
to their fair share of liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court made clear in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Associates291 that lower courts, in fashioning a rea-
sonable range test, must consider two goals: equitable allocation of costs
and encouraging settlement. The Tech-Bilt court also counseled against
stressing either goal to the exclusion of the other. Settlements in multi-
tortfeasor litigation which create the possibility of one defendant paying
substantially more than his share of fault promote only partial settlement
and ignore equitable apportionment.
The key to the good faith of sliding scale agreements rests in requir-
ing the settling party to contribute at least a minimum amount that is
within the reasonable range of his fair share of liability to a final judg-
ment. In this way, the settling party and the plaintiff receive the benefits
of settling while the nonsettling party is protected from shouldering a
portion of the verdict grossly disproportionate to his degree of fault. In
such an agreement both goals are balanced, but neither is ignored.
Michael McGuinness
290. Id. at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
291. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
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